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Case No. 20080239-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Carl Fleming, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Carl Fleming appeals from the denial of his post-conviction petition 
challenging convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping, both 
first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(f) 
(West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Where Fleming does not acknowledge, let alone challenge, the post-
conviction court's bases for dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, has he 
shown error in the court's decision? 
Standard of Review. On appeal from the denial of a petition for post-conviction 
relief, this Court "review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness/' 
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949,950 (Utah App. 1998). This Court will reverse the 
court's factual findings "only if they are clearly erroneous/7 Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions, relevant to this appeal, are attached at 
Addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (West 2004) (kidnapping); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) (aggravated kidnapping); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004) (aggravated kidnapping); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (West 2004) (unlawful detention); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004) (post-conviction statute); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (West 2004) (post-conviction statute). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Fleming was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and one count of aggravated kidnapping, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004), all first degree felonies. Cr. R. 
4-5. After a preliminary hearing, one count of aggravated robbery was dismissed, 
and Fleming was bound over on the remaining counts. Cr. R. 37; Cr. R. 151:40-41. 
1
 A record of Fleming's criminal trial is not included in the record on appeal. 
The description of the criminal proceedings and the evidence presented therein, 
therefore, are taken from the State's Brief of Appellee filed in the direct appeal. To 
differentiate between citations to the record in the criminal proceeding and citations 
to the record on post-conviction, the State has preceded citations to the criminal 
proceeding with a Cr. 
2 
The prosecutor submitted several proposed jury instructions before trial, 
including elements and definitions instructions. Cr. R. 65-85. Before jury voir dire, 
defense counsel told the trial court that he had reviewed the State's proposed 
instructions, found them "to be appropriate," and had no "problem with them." Cr. 
R. 152:5. Consequently, the trial court gave all of the prosecutor's proposed 
instructions as submitted. Compare Cr. R. 65-85 with Cr. R. 95-122. The jury 
convicted Fleming as charged. Cr. R. 124; Cr. R. 165. 
The trial court sentenced Fleming to concurrent prison terms of five years to 
life for aggravated robbery and ten years to life for aggravated kidnapping. Cr. R. 
130-32. Fleming filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Cr. R. 
136. The supreme court transferred the appeal to this Court. Cr. R. 147. 
On appeal, Fleming claimed that "he received ineffective assistance of [trial] 
counsel based on trial counsel's failure to object to jury instructions, failure to move 
to merge the charges, and mishandling of the trial itself." State v. Fleming, 2005 UT 
App 394 (Addendum B). In an unpublished memorandum decision, this Court 
rejected those claims and affirmed Fleming's convictions. See id. Fleming's petition 
for writ of certiorari was denied. See State v. Fleming, 132 P.3d 683 (Utah 2006). 
3 
Fleming then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. R. 5-163. In that 
original petition, Fleming raised numerous claims and sub-claims, including a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. R. 11-46 (Addendum C). 
Because Fleming's petition did not meet the requirements of rule 65C, of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the post-conviction court ordered Fleming to amend 
his petition. R. 174-79 (Addendum D). In that same order, the post-conviction court 
indicated that, although it found most of Fleming's original claims frivolous, it 
found three that were not. R. 175-78. The court identified those three claims as: 
(1) "The claim that the jury instruction on Aggravated 
Kidnapping was erroneous because it added the element of 
'seizing, confining, detaining or transporting . . . ' which only 
expressly applies to the offense of Child Kidnapping:"; 
(2) 'The claim of error as to instructions which referenced Theft 
and Financial Transaction Card crimes because Fleming was not 
charged with those crimes7'; and 
(3) 'The claim of ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel for 
failure to correct the above two referenced errors/' 
R. 177-78. 
In his amended petition, Fleming listed all three of the claims identified by 
the post-conviction court as non-frivolous as well as a prosecutorial misconduct 
claim from his original petition. R. 180-87 (Addendum E). Fleming did not 
4 
challenge the trial court's ruling that the remaining claims from his original petition 
were frivolous. :^c id. 
' 1 1 Lepost-coi i v ictloi LCO urt ordered tl ie State of [ Jtal itc i espond to the petition. 
I ! 1 88 89 1! 90 91 I I a > Stal c j filed • i :: : L : ti< : n i i o • lisniiss the petition R 249-365 
(Addendum F (without addenda)). 
After a hearing on February 27, 2008, the post-conviction court granted the 
State's motion L dismiss. P. 448; R. 458-66 (Addendum G). The court ruled that 
"[m]os; oi [t-ieming's] claims .Liil because they already were or cnulo ru/. •.: i^ n 
S . I M \ . . , . - . . Iftji i.ec i il |y clain i, thatremai i is isi; \ ;' - . V r ••; • p- ]; -
•- rr - • '-^  TV * •- : J raise claims of ineffective assistance of Uiai 
counsel/' 1d. 
Concerning Fleming's ineffective assistance challenge to the aggravated 
kidnapping instructions, the post-conviction court concluded that "the difference in 
terminology bet v\ eei i tl leaggra vatedkid napping stat u/teai id tl le jui > in str i icti : i i s 
- •- !•""!.- i •• ' -• *-•' v -.{•" ' / a - n o t 
ineffective for not alleging on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the erroneous jury instructions, because even if this issue had been raised 
on appeal, there was no reasonable probability that the result v\, uu; nace oeen 
different. 
5 
The post-conviction court also rejected Fleming's challenge to the theft and 
financial transaction card crimes instructions because "those jury instructions were 
appropriate/' R. 464. 
Finally, the post-conviction court rejected Fleming's prosecutorial misconduct 
claims, concluding that "[ajppellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising a 
claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, because no prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred." Id. 
Fleming timely appealed. R. 452-53. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Stephen Porter was filling his car with gas when Fleming, a stranger, begged 
him for a ride. Cr. R152:70, 74-75. Porter reluctantly agreed. Cr. R152:74-75. 
Fleming thanked him by holding a blade to his throat, threatening to kill him, and 
stealing his watch, CD player, debit card, and PIN number. Cr. R. 152:78-80, 84. 
Fleming then forced Porter to accompany him to three different ATM's while 
Fleming and his friend withdrew as much money from Porter's account as his limit 
would allow. Cr. R. 152:84-90. 
"He continued to pester me and pester me and pester me...." 
On November 7, 2003, Porter, a 23-year-old senior at BYU, left Provo in his 
two-door Toyota Tercel to visit his parents in West Valley City. Cr. R. 152:70-72. 
6 
Instead of taking a direct route, Porter chose a route that was longer but took k\ s 
time. Cr. R. 152,171-94. 
Along the way, i ori^i :w ; . . ^ .. . .: • --: _. ~ _ 2. 
Porter, however, knew of a gas station on 1300 South and State Street called 
Wayne's Corner. Porter's sister used to work across the street from Wayne's 
Corner, and Porter had bought gas there before. Id, Thinking that Wayne's Corner 
was closer than Red w OOG K, >cd -: ^orter exited i~-i: . MIL, - i 3UU bouth and traveled east 
,A .. ridit -v • . -- - • Porter passed 
• ~-T"\ . .--I ; ' , i>T "^ *' - \ id nc i: stop at 
either station because a mechanic friend had told him that their gas contained an 
additive that would ruin his engine. Cr. R. 152:72-73. 
At Wayne's Corner, Porter used his debit card to pre-pa)^ for his gas. Cr. R, 
J ^ : / s . Sorter did not have any cash on him., nor did he like to carry a lot of cash 
becau se i tmadel Li s ' ' ^ JI L! let a little bulgy." Cr R 1 52:75-76 A s Porter pu in ped gas, 
Fleming approached him and asked for a ride. Cr. R. 152:74. Porter, who had never 
seen Fleming before, initially " tried to blow him off by telling him [that Porter] was 
meeting some friends." Cr. R. 152:70, 75, 98. When that "didn'i work/' Porter told 
Fleming that one of his friends • was in li L(J hospital, -,' i_i o;:c\\ needed to go to the 
7 
hospital/' Cr. R. 152:75. But Fleming persisted, saying that he also needed to go to 
the hospital. Id. As proof, Fleming showed Porter a bruise on his knuckle. Id. 
When Fleming continued "to pester me and pester me and pester me," Porter 
relented and agreed to give him a ride. Id. 
Fleming followed Porter into the gas station store while Porter bought mints 
with his debit card. Cr. R. 152:76. The two then got into Porter's car and drove off. 
Cr. R. 152:77. Fleming told Porter that he needed to first stop by his parents' home 
to let them know where he was going. Id. Fleming told Porter to go south on State 
Street. Cr. R. 152:77-78. Fleming then asked Porter if he "ever did drugs." Cr. R. 
152:89. When Porter said "no," Fleming refused to believe him. Id. Fleming 
confided that he was at that moment on methamphetamine. Id. 
"Give me all your money or I will kill you." 
Fleming ultimately directed Porter to a house on a dead-end street behind the 
Franklin-Covey baseball field. Cr. R. 152:78. Fleming asked Porter "to kill the 
engine because he didn't want to wake his parents up." Id. When Porter obeyed, 
Fleming reached into his coat pocket and pulled out "a blade of some sort." Id. 
Holding the blade in his right hand, Fleming reached across Porter and held it 
against the left side of Porter's neck. Cr. R. 152:98. Porter could not see the blade, 
8 
but he "sure felt it" Id. Porter thought it felt like a "razor or a box-cutting knife," 
Cr, R. 152:99-100. 
Fleming told P ,!ortei to [g]i * e 'n t,e a 11 y o i n n LOI Ley • :)i I * • i 111 :i 11 y o i; i " Ci R. 
i V^^II r'ii!itTgd\'e fl^niiiir bK w.ilM Mihju^b UT ", <IIIH 'Tvitairvd no »^one\, it 
. . .• T-,.. ..(-^,/s dgbit Card. Id. Fleming took the card, looked at it, and asked what he 
could do with it. Id. Porter explained that Fleming "could buy whatever he wanted 
with it" LI Unsatisfied, Fleming demanded something else. Jrf Terniieu, I orf-~r 
handed Fleming his watch, his CD player. 
After taking all of Porter's belongings, Fleming vx\ ihe j iu i e away, but 
ordered Porter to drive to a friend's house, a few blocks south. Cr. R. 152:80-81. 
Fleming told Porter that if he "tried to escape or tried to run away he would kill 
[him]." Lr. K. 1DJ.SU. When theyreach-j^ ::i^ :n^ . •. - :.:.,•:, ' j j ; : : - . , I 
ml of 11K iai, an I the\ bnlh \\ rill't <1 In Ihe IIIMU » i I' pi'* SI Heminp; warned 
nr-rh:i ' o've a-v x\ that if !w>1 ran or anything [Fleming] had a gun and . . . would 
K • . ' " ^ :> V-
Fleming's friend was not at home. Cr. R. 152:81-82. As the two walked back 
*-~ the car, Fleming took Porter's car keys. *. . . j - . ^ - . . i leming ^c: 
9 
driver's seat while Porter got into the front passenger's seat. Id, Porter did not try 
to escape because he "felt [his] life was in danger." Id. Fleming had "told [Porter] 
he had a gun, and there was nothing to dispute that." Id, And Porter had seen "the 
look in [Fleming's] eyes when he held the blade against [Porter's] throat." Porter 
was convinced that Fleming "would not have hesitated to use it." Id, 
"I felt that if I didn't cooperate with him fully, I would be dead." 
Fleming then drove to an apartment complex across the street from Wayne's 
Corner. Cr. R. 152:83. Fleming pulled into the parking lot, "stuck his head out the 
window and called for another friend of his." Id, A woman, Sharon Thomas, yelled 
back and came downstairs. Cr. R. 152:83,114-15. Fleming had Porter get into the 
back seat, while Thomas took his place in the front. Cr. R. 152:83. 
Although Porter could have run at this point, he "felt like he had no place to 
run." Cr. R. 152:84. Porter believed Fleming "still had a gun" and that if Porter 
"tried to move [Fleming] would kill [him]." Id, Porter did not "feel safe going back 
to Wayne's Corner, because that's where [he] first met [Fleming]." Id, Also, by then 
it was around 10:00 p.m. and all the nearby businesses "looked closed." Id. 
Once Thomas was in the car, Fleming held up Porter's card and announced he 
had a credit card. Cr. R. 152:116. Fleming wanted Thomas to use it to buy him 
cigarettes "or charge something." Id, When Thomas pointed out that the card was 
10 
"a cash card," Fleming told her that it belonged to Porter. Cr. R. 152:117. Thomas 
asked, "If it is his card, why didn't he use it?" Fleming replied, "I don't want him 
to." 
Thomas asked Porter if the card was his. Cr. R. 152:117. When Porter said 
"yes," Thomas asked, "Well, are you giving me permission to use it?" Id. Porter 
replied, "Yes." Cr. R. 152:117,126. Thomas then asked for his PIN number. Cr. R. 
152:117. Porter gave it to her because he "didn't feel like [he] had a choice." Cr. R. 
152:85. Porter "felt that if [he] didn't cooperate with [Fleming] fully, [Porter] would 
be dead." Id. 
Fleming drives Porter to three different ATM's 
Fleming drove Porter and Thomas to a 7-Eleven on about 500 East and 1300 
South. Cr. R. 152:85. Thomas went in to use the ATM while Fleming and Porter 
waited in the car. Id. Fleming threatened that if Porter made "eye contact with 
anybody or if [Porter did] anything stupid, that [Fleming] would kill [Porter]." Id. 
Porter promised to "be cool." Id. But after waiting about five minutes for Thomas, 
Fleming began "getting nervous." Cr. R. 152:85-86. Noticing this, Porter suggested 
that they go inside. Cr. R. 152:86. Porter hoped that he could "make eye contact or 
signal someone." Id. Fleming agreed, but before the two went inside he "reminded 
11 
[Porter] that he had the gun, and he told [Porter] that if [he] tried anything stupid, 
he would kill [him]." Id. 
Fleming entered the 7-Eleven first, with Porter closely following him. Cr. R. 
152:105, 143-44. Porter tried to catch someone's eye, but "[n]o one would look at 
[him]." Cr. R. 152:87. Thomas joined them and the three left the store, with Thomas 
leaving first, then Fleming, and lastly Porter. Id. They all got back into the car in the 
same positions as before. Id. Thomas had made two $60.00 withdrawals from the 
ATM. Cr. Defense Exhibits 1, 2,3. 
Fleming then drove to a drive-through ATM at a Wells Fargo Bank on 300 
South. Cr. R. 152:89, 121; Cr. Defense Ex. 4. Thomas asked Porter for his PIN 
number again because she "kept forgetting it/' Cr. R. 152:117. Thomas then got out 
of the passenger door and walked around to the ATM where she withdrew $200.00 
from Porter's account. Cr. R. 152:118; Cr. Defense Ex. 4. 
When Thomas returned to the car, she and Fleming "seemed a little 
confused." Cr. R. 152:89. Neither of them knew where another 7-Eleven or gas 
station was, "so [they] drove around a little bit and eventually stumbled" onto a 7-
Eleven at 1300 East and 200 South. Id; Cr. Defense Ex. 5,6,7. Thomas again went in 
alone while Fleming and Porter waited in the car. Cr. R. 152:89-90. Thomas 
withdrew another $200.00. Cr. Defense Ex. 5. Thomas returned to the car. Cr. R. 
12 
152:90. Angry that Thomas had not withdrawn more money, Fleming senther hack 
into the store to get more. Id. 
Thomas tried to withdraw an additional $400.00, but that request was denied 
because Porter's limit of $500.00 had been reached. Cr. R. 152:90; Cr. Defense Ex. 6. 
Thomas then tried to withdraw another $100.00, but that request was also denied. 
Cr. Defense Ex. 7. 
When Thomas returned to the car, she told Fleming that the ATM would not 
let her withdraw any more money. Cr. R. 152:119. She and Fleming then divided 
the money between them. Cr. R. 152:90-91. Thomas asked Porter if he was "OK/' 
Cr. R. 152:120. Before Porter could answer, Fleming told him, "Don't fucking talk to 
her . . . / ' Id. Angry, Thomas told Porter, "Let me the hell out." Id. Fleming 
dropped Thomas off at about South Temple and 700 East. Cr. R. 152:120-21. Porter 
moved up to the front passenger seat. Cr. R. 152:91, 
Fleming then drove Porter along North Temple to the State Fairgrounds. Id. 
On the way, Porter saw a police car on their right side. Id. Porter noted that the 
officer "watched [him] very closely when they passed him." Id. Fleming warned 
Porter "especially if I tried to get their attention he would kill me." Id. 
Fleming stopped the car on a side street near the fairgrounds where he 
"pause[d] a little bit" and "wipe[d] his fingerprints off the steering wheel." Cr. R. 
13 
152:92. Fleming then told Porter that if he told "anyone what happened, he would 
kill [Porter]." Id. 
Porter drove directly to his parents' home because his "feeling of security had 
just been completely ripped from [him]. [He] felt vulnerable, [he] felt weak, [he] felt 
alone." Cr. R. 152:93. Porter did not drive to a police station because he did not 
know where one was. Cr. R. 152:92. He also did not stop to call police from a pay 
phone because he had no money. Id. 
After Porter returned home, he discovered a small clear, plastic tube or vial 
wedged in the driver's seat, between the back and the seat. Cr. R. 152:101,108-09. 
Porter recalled that during the robbery and kidnapping, Fleming had handed this 
vial to Porter to hold. Cr. R. 152:101. Fleming told Porter that the tube contained 
methamphetamine. Id. Porter had tried to hold the vial on the edges so that he 
would not get his fingerprints on it. Cr. R. 152:110. Porter had hoped that doing so 
would also preserve Fleming's fingerprints. Id. 
Porter's parents arrived home soon after he got there. Cr. R. 152:93. After 
they talked and hugged, Porter called the police and reported the robbery and 
kidnapping. Id. At that time, Porter told police about the vial he found in his car. 
Cr. R. 152:108. At the officer's request, Porter later took the vial to the police station. 
Cr. R. 152:108-09. The police, however, did not test the contents of the vial, nor did 
14 
they check it for fingerprints, because they saw no evidentiary value in doing so. 
Cr. R. 152:145. 
The defense 
In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted that Porter was not 
robbed, but was only getting even for a fraudulent drug deal. Cr. R. 152:64-68. 
Counsel explained that Fleming was a drug dealer who offered to sell Porter some 
methamphetamine. Cr. R. 152:64-65. Counsel claimed that since Porter did not 
have any cash, he, Fleming, and Thomas went to several different locations where 
they withdrew cash in order to pay for the drugs. Cr. R. 152:65-67. Defense counsel 
claimed that Porter waited to call police until after he got home because it was only 
then that he discovered that Fleming had sold him rock salt instead of 
methamphetamine. Cr. R. 152:67. Defense counsel also asserted that Porter never 
described a knife or blade of any sort to police. Id. Defense counsel explained that 
when Fleming was apprehended over two months later, police found "a little tool in 
his pocket" that included "a small knife blade." Id. Counsel suggested that when 
police described this "little fold-out tool" to Porter, he adopted that description as 
the blade that Fleming held to his neck. Cr. R. 152:67-68. 
To support his theory of the case, defense counsel elicited from Porter on 
cross-examination that Porter had taken a longer route to his home and passed 
15 
several gas stations before reaching Wayne's Corner. Cr. R. 152:94-97. Defense 
counsel elicited from Thomas on cross-examination that she had never seen Fleming 
display a knife or gun and that she never heard Fleming threaten Porter. Cr. R. 
152:125-26. Counsel also elicited from Thomas, a drug addict, that she knew that 
drug deals were regularly conducted at Wayne's Corner. Cr. R. 152:123. Thomas 
also testified on cross that although she did not know if Fleming was an " actual 
drug dealer," she had seen him sell drugs to people in the past. Id. 
In addition to building his case on cross-examination, defense counsel called 
Detective Todd Mitchell. Cr. R. 152:131,149. Detective Mitchell testified that Porter 
described the blade that Fleming had used "as a metallic-colored, switchblade-
shaped object." Cr. R. 152:134. When Fleming was arrested, about two-and-one-
half months after the robbery, Fleming had on him a small "tool or knife, gadget." 
Cr. R. 152:132-33. Detective Mitchell believed that this small "tool" was "close" to 
the blade that Porter had described to him. Cr. R. 152:134-35. Detective Mitchell 
also testified that he had obtained bank records showing the withdrawals from 
Porter's bank account that night. Cr. R. 152:135-36. See Cr. Defense Exhibits 1-7. 
None of those records showed Porter's claimed purchase of gas and mints at 
Wayne's Corner. Cr. R. 152:139. When questioned about this, Detective Mitchell 
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said that he must have only requested the records for the ATM withdrawals, 
although he did not specifically recall doing so. Cr. R. 152:139-40. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Fleming appeals from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition after the 
post-conviction court concluded that Fleming was not entitled to relief under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. On appeal, however, Fleming does not demonstrate 
error in the dismissal of his petition. Rather, Fleming asserts the same claims raised 
below, plus additional ones, without ever acknowledging the post-conviction 
court's ruling. 
Fleming's claims fail, first, because he does not acknowledge, let alone 
address, the post-conviction court's ruling. He also does not present any evidence 
or legal authority showing error in that ruling. Thus, his claims fail as inadequately 
briefed. 
Fleming's claims fail, second, because he has not demonstrated that he was 
entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The Act precludes any 
claims already raised and rejected on direct appeal. At least two of Fleming's claims 
were raised and rejected on direct appeal. Thus, those claims are precluded under 
the Act. 
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The Act also precludes any claims that could have been but were not raised 
on direct appeal unless Fleming can show ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Fleming has not made that showing as to any of his remaining claims. Thus, he has 
not shown that he was entitled to relief under the ineffective assistance provision of 
the Act. 
ARGUMENT 
WHERE FLEMING DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGE, LET ALONE 
CHALLENGE, THE POST-CONVICTION COURTS BASES FOR 
DISMISSING HIS POST-CONVICTION PETITION, HE HAS NOT SHOWN 
ERROR IN THE COURT'S DECISION 
In his Statement of the Issues, Fleming identifies two claims on appeal. First, 
he argues that "erroneous jury instructions require a reversal of [his] aggravated 
kidnapping conviction/' Aplt. Br. at 2. Second, he argues that "a new trial [is] in 
order on the grounds of ineffective [assistance] of [trial] counsel." Id. at 2, 7. 
However, in his argument, Fleming does not acknowledge, let alone show error in, 
the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition. Thus, Fleming's appeal fails.2 
2
 In the Conclusion section of his brief, Fleming asserts a third claim, that his 
aggravated kidnapping conviction should have merged with his aggravated 
robbery conviction. Id. at 11. Fleming, however, did not raise this claim in his post-
conviction petition. See R. 180-87. More importantly, this Court rejected Fleming's 
claim on direct appeal, see State v. Fleming, 2005 UT App 394, and Fleming cannot 
raise claims on post-conviction that have already been "raised or addressed . . . on 
appeal," Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b). 
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Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, a petitioner is not entitled to relief 
on any ground that was raised or addressed at trial or on [direct] appeal. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004).3 Nor, absent a showing of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, is he entitled to relief on any ground that "could 
have been but was not raised at trial or on [direct] appeal." See id. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) 
& -106(2). Although the State "has the burden of pleading" the grounds of 
preclusion, "petitioner has the burden to disprove [their] existence by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Id. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004). 
In this case, the post-conviction court dismissed Fleming's post-conviction 
petition because the claims raised therein could have been raised on direct appeal 
and Fleming failed to demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective in not 
raising them there. R. 461-64. Fleming has not shown error in the post-conviction 
court's ruling. 
3
 In 2008, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act was substantially amended and 
re-codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 to -405. See 2008 Utah Laws ch. 3 
§§ 1165-80 (effective February 7,2008); 2008 Utah Laws ch. 288, §§ 1-9 (effective May 
5, 2008); 2008 Utah Laws ch. 358 §§ 2-9 (effective May 5, 2008); 2008 Utah Laws ch. 
382, § 2240 (effective May 5,2008). Because none of the 2008 amendments apply to 
Fleming's petition, the State cites to the statute in effect when Fleming filed his 
petition. 
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A, Fleming's claims fail because Fleming has not attempted to show, 
let alone shown, error in the post-conviction court's rulings. 
Fleming's claims fail because he has not shown error in the post-conviction 
court's dismissal of his petition. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's brief 
to set forth an argument that "contain[s] the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on/' It is not enough under this rule to 
superficially cite legal authority; rather, the rule requires a "substantive 
examination" of the contention presented. State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, f % 11-13,974 
P.2d 269. Moreover, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at f 11 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 6,1 
P.3d 1108. "'It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments 
that are not adequately briefed/" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f 15, 99 P.3d 820 
(quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998)). 
In this case, Fleming asserts two alleged errors in his original trial 
proceedings. See Aplt. Br. at 2. However, Fleming makes no attempt to 
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demonstrate that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his post-conviction 
petition. See id. at 2-11. Specifically, Fleming cites no evidence or legal authority 
demonstrating that the post-conviction court erred in ruling that he was not entitled 
to relief on the claims under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See id. Thus, 
contrary to the requirements of rule 24(a)(9), Fleming has simply / /dump[ed] the 
burden of argument and research" onto this Court. See Thomas, 1999 UT 2, l|[lf 11-13. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should refuse to reach Fleming's claims. See, 
e.g., Green, 2004 UT 76,1f 15. 
B. Fleming's claims fail because the post-conviction court properly 
dismissed his petition under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
Alternatively, Fleming's claims fail because the post-conviction court properly 
ruled that Fleming had failed to establish that he was entitled to relief under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
As stated, under the Act, "[a] person is not eligible for [post-conviction] relief 
. . . upon any ground that . . . could have been but was not raised . . . on appeal" 
unless he can show that "the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel/' id. § 78-35a-106(l)(c), (2). 
"The standard for judging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the 
same as the standard for judging ineffective assistance of trial counsel/7 Bruner v. 
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Carver, 920 P.2d 1153,1157 (Utah 1996). To prove ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, therefore, Fleming had to show both that his appellate counsel's 
performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced by that deficient 
performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). "Failure to raise 
an issue that is without merit 'does not constitute constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel.'" Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, f 48, 44 P.3d 626 (citation 
omitted). Moreover, failure to raise even a nonfrivolous claim on appeal does not, 
by itself, establish ineffective assistance "because the Sixth Amendment does not 
require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal." Id. Rather, for that 
error to be prejudicial, it "must be such that [this Court] lose[s] confidence in the 
result on appeal." Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1991). 
1. Fleming was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act on his jury instruction claim. 
Fleming asserts that his trial was flawed because the aggravated kidnapping 
jury instructions contained language that is no longer included in the aggravated 
kidnapping statute. See Aplt. Br. at 2,10. 
On direct appeal, Fleming claimed that he received ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel because his counsel failed to object to erroneous aggravated 
kidnapping jury instructions. See State v. Fleming, 2005 UT App 394. However, as 
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the State noted in its responsive brief, Fleming did not challenge the instructions 
based on the "seizes, confines, detains or transports" language. See Brief of Aple. 
(Addendum H). Fleming's present claim challenging that language, therefore, was 
obviously one that "could have been but was not raised... on appeal." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c). Thus, to be entitled to post-conviction relief based on that 
claim, Fleming had to show that "the failure to raise that ground [on appeal] was 
due to ineffective assistance of [appellate] counsel." Id. at § 78-35a-106(2). 
Fleming did not and could not make that showing. Jury Instruction 20 
generally defined the crime of aggravated kidnapping. That instruction provided, 
in relevant part, that 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person commits 
Aggravated Kidnapping if that person intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the 
victim, by any means and in any manner seizes, confines, 
detains, or transports the victim with intent. . . to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission 
or attempted commission of a felony. 
Jury Instruction 24, the elements instruction, then required the State to prove that 
defendant's "seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation" of the victim "was 
committed with the intent to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or 
flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony." 
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As the State noted on direct appeal, both of the instructions used language 
from a prior version of the aggravated kidnapping statute. Before 2001, a person 
committed aggravated kidnapping if he "by any means and in any manner, seize[d], 
confine[d], detain[ed], or transported] the victim" with one of the specified intents, 
including the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
302 (1999). The former statute did not require that any detention last for a certain 
period of time. Effective April 30, 2001, the aggravated kidnapping statute was 
amended to simply provide that one commits aggravated kidnapping if he, "in the 
course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping," acts with one of the 
specified statutory intents, including the intent to facilitate the commission of a 
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004); 2001 Utah Laws ch. 301, § 4. A 
person commits unlawful detention if he "detains or restrains the victim under 
circumstances not constituting a violation of [kidnapping, child kidnapping, or 
aggravated kidnapping]." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (West 2004). A person 
commits kidnapping, inter alia, if he "detains or restrains the victim for any 
substantial period of time" or he "moves the victim any substantial distance." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-301(1) (West 2004). 
Although a variation of simple kidnapping requires the detention to last for a 
substantial period time, unlawful detention does not have any time element. Thus, 
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the current aggravated kidnapping statute still does not require a detention for any 
set period of time. And, because the current aggravated kidnapping statute still 
does not require a detention for any set period of time, inclusion of the "seizes," 
"confines" and "transports" language is harmless, since all those acts, if done 
"without authority of law and against the will of the victim," require at least some 
detention or restraint of the victim. 
Moreover, as the post-conviction court ruled, even if "[t]he term 'transport' 
may be a lower standard than 'moves the victim any substantial distance," 
"transporting or moving the victim was not at issue in this case [where] [b]oth 
parties agreed that the victim and the defendant were in a car[] and drove to several 
ATMs." R.463. 
Thus, as the post-conviction court found, even though jury instructions 20 and 
24 used the former statutory language, "the difference in terminology was not 
significant in this case." R. 463. As a consequence, even if Fleming's appellate 
counsel had raised the issue on appeal, "there was no reasonable probability that the 
result [of Fleming's appeal] would have been different." Id. Fleming's ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim, therefore, failed under the prejudice prong. 
See Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 336. 
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And, because Fleming's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim 
failed, the post-conviction court properly ruled that Fleming was not entitled to 
relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
106(l)(c), (2). 
2. Fleming was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claims. 
Fleming asserts numerous claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 8-10. Specifically, Fleming claims that trial counsel was 
ineffective because (1) he "introduced] . . . harmful evidence and fail[ed] to 
recognize helpful evidence"; (2) he "fail[ed] to object to strong issues within the 
sound strategy of setting up appeal"; (3) he failed to "reiterate Sharon Thompson's 
testimony that she used Porter[']s card and personal identification number with his 
permission"; (4) he failed to "impeach" Sharon Thompson with evidence that she 
"gave her testimony in exchange for transaction[al] immunity for all offenses"; (5) 
he failed to argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove "that Porter was held 
against his will" in connection with the aggravated kidnapping charge; (6) he failed 
to object to the "seizes, confines, detains, or transports" language in the aggravated 
kidnapping jury instructions; and (7) he should have argued that Fleming's 
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aggravated kidnapping conviction merged with his aggravated robbery conviction. 
Mat 8-11. 
a. Three of Fleming's claims fail because they were raised 
and rejected on appeal. 
Fleming's first, fourth, and seventh claims—that trial counsel "introduce[ed] 
harmful evidence and fail[ed] to recognize helpful evidence," that counsel should 
have impeached Sharon Thompson with evidence that she "gave her testimony in 
exchange for transaction immunity for all offenses," and that counsel should have 
raised a merger claim, Aplt. Br. at 8-11—are all claims that were raised and rejected 
by this Court on direct appeal. See State v. Fleming, 2005 UT App 394. Thus, these 
claims were precluded from being raised in a post-conviction petition under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(a). 
b. The remainder of Fleming's claims fail because he has not 
shown ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
Each of Fleming's remaining claims are claims "that could have been but 
w[ere] not raised . . . on [direct] appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c). Thus, 
to be entitled to post-conviction relief on them, Fleming must show that "the failure 
to raise [these claims on appeal] was due to ineffective assistance of [appellate] 
counsel." Id. at § 76-35a-106(2). Absent such a showing, Fleming is not entitled to 
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post-conviction relief on those claims. See id. § 78-35a-106(l)(c), (2). Fleming has not 
made that showing as to any of his claims here. 
Fleming's second claim—that trial counsel "failfed] to object to strong issues 
within the sound strategy of setting up appeal," Aplt Br. at 8—is too general and 
vague to determine whether he raised this claim below. It is also too general and 
vague to support an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, let alone an 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. Cf. State v. Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, 
If 20,125 P.3d 103 (holding that, to show deficient performance, defendant "must 
point to specific instances in tlie record where assistance was inadequate") (emphasis 
added). Thus, Fleming has not demonstrated that he was entitled to relief on this 
claim under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
106(l)(c), (2). 
Fleming's third claim—that trial counsel failed to "reiterate Sharon 
Thompson's testimony that she used Porter[']s card and personal identification 
number with his permission," Aplt. Br. at 9—was not raised below. R. 5-46,180-87. 
Therefore, it is not properly before this Court. Moreover, as previously stated, to 
establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Fleming must show both that his 
counsel performed deficiently, and that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient 
performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. And Fleming's claim of prejudice must 
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be a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter/' State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 
48, 50 (Utah 1998). Absent a record of the criminal trial court proceedings, which 
Fleming has not included in the record on appeal, Fleming cannot meet that burden 
as to either his trial counsel or his appellate counsel. Thus, Fleming also has not 
demonstrated that he was entitled to relief on this claim under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c), (2). 
Fleming's fifth claim—that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
aggravated kidnapping conviction—was arguably waived when Fleming failed to 
include it in his amended petition after including it in his initial petition. Compare R. 
3-48 with R. 180-87. In any case, "[i]n challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, 
the burden on the defendant is heavy. Defendant must marshal all evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the verdict." State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378,381 (Utah App. 1992) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted; emphasis omitted); see also State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 
966 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). Fleming 
has nowhere marshaled all of the evidence supporting the verdicts in his case. See 
Aplt. Br. at 9. Consequently, he has not shown that there would have been any 
merit to an insufficiency of the evidence claim. Absent that showing, Fleming 
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cannot show that either his trial counsel or his appellate counsel was ineffective in 
not raising it. Again, therefore, Fleming has not demonstrated that he was entitled 
to relief on this claim under Post-Conviction Remedies Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-106(l)(c), (2). 
Finally, as demonstrated in Point I supra, Fleming's sixth claim—that counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to the "seizes, confines, detains, or transports" 
language in the aggravated kidnapping instruction—fails under the prejudice 
prong. Thus, the post-conviction court properly concluded that appellate counsel 
was not ineffective in not raising this claim on appeal. R. 463. And, because 
appellate counsel was not ineffective in not raising this claim on appeal, Fleming 
was not entitled to relief under the Post Conviction Remedies Act. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c), (2). 
In sum, Fleming has not shown that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel by failing to raise Fleming's ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims. Consequently, Fleming has not shown that he was entitled to post-
conviction relief on those claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the dismissal of Fleming's 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted July z Z 2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
[J /7 J. • r 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
Addenda 
§ 7 8 - 3 5 a - 1 0 5 . Burden of proof 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respon-
dent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burdeii tb 
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
§ 7 8 - 3 5 a -106 . Preclusion of relief—Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground 
that: 
va) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction 
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis tfiat the ground could have teen but was not raised at trial or on appeal, 
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 3 0 1 . Kidnapping 
(1) An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to 
risk of bodily injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minor's parent 
or legal guardian or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the 
minor is 14 years of age or older but younger than 18 year? of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is 
a mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 3 0 2 . Aggravated kidnapping (Weft lOG^ 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of 
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) a.cts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or 
to compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 
4, Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention 
or kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which 
may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 
76-3-406. 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by any 
means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim: 
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of the kidnaping, the actor possesses, 
uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76*1-601; or 
(b) with intent: 
(i) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear 
from engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to inflict bodilj injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(iv) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function; or 
(v) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit 
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than 16 years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the 
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the 
victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punishable by imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term of not less than 6,10, or 15 years and which 
may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 
76-3-406. 
6W) 
§ 76-5-304. Unlawful detention 
(1) An actor commits unlawful detention if the actor intentionally or know-
ingly, without authority of law, and against the will of the victim, detains or 
restrains the victim under circumstances not constituting a violation of: 
(a) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301; 
J>) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or 
(c) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is 
a mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
(Not For Official Publication) 
*1 Third District, Salt Lake Department, 
041900437 The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg 
Carl Stanley Fleming appeals his convictions on 
charges of aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnaping. He asserts on appeal that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial 
counsel's failure to object to jury instructions, 
failure to move to merge the charges, and 
mishandling of the trial itself. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, "a 
defendant must first demonstrate that counsel's 
performance was deficient, in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment."State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 
12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984))."Second, fee defendant 
must show that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial-i.e., that it affected the outcome of the 
case.'7d Furthermore, to establish the first prong of 
the test, a defendant is required to "rebut the strong 
presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy.''/^, (quotations and citation omitted). 
Fleming argues that the jury instructions allowed 
the jury to reach a nonunanimous verdict, and thus 
counsel's failure to object to the instructions was 
ineffective assistance. However, the premise of 
Fleming's argument, that the jury instructions 
provided the jury with an opportunity to convict on 
theories not charged, is incorrect The instruction 
giving the statutory definition of aggravated 
kidnaping included three possible intents, including 
the one charged. However, the elements instruction 
clearly stated the single intent the jury was required 
to find in order to convict Fleming of aggravated 
kidnaping. 
The elements instruction provided that the jury must 
find four elements beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to convict Fleming. The intent element 
provided that the jury must find "[t]hat such seizure, 
confinement, detention, or transportation was 
committed with the intent to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony." 
This is the sole option upon which the jury could 
convict Fleming. As noted by Fleming, juries are 
presumed to follow jury instructions. SeeState v. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998). The jury 
is presumed to have followed the elements 
instruction, without importing two other statutory 
intents from another instruction that do not meet the 
clearly stated required finding. Because the 
elements instruction clearly stated only one option 
for the jury to find Fleming guilty, there was no 
error by trial counsel in failing to object to the 
instructions. 
Fleming also asserts that the charge of aggravated 
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kidnaping should have merged with aggravated 
robbery, and thus, counsel was ineffective in failing 
to move to merge the charges. Because robbery 
necessarily requires a detention at some level, to 
sustain a kidnaping conviction in addition to 
robbery, the acts constituting the kidnaping must be 
separate and independent from the robbery, and not 
merely incidental to it. SeeState v. Finlayson, 2000 
UT 10, f 19, 994 P.2d 1243."[To] convict a 
robber of aggravated kidnaping as well as 
aggravated robbery, ... the prosecutor must first 
show that the detention was beyond 'the minimum 
inherent in [aggravated robbery]." ' State v. 
Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, \ 30, 9 P.3d 777 
(quoting State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 
1981)). Additionally, "the detention element must 
be 'significantly independent' of the detention 
inherent in the host crime." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 
at ^23 . 
*2 Utah appellate courts have applied a three-part 
test in assessing whether a detention during a host 
crime may be sufficient to support a kidnaping 
charge. See idlf a detention or confinement 
is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the 
resulting movement or confinement: (a) must not be 
slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the 
other crime; (b) must not be of the kind inherent in 
the nature of the other crime; and (c) must have 
some significance independent of the other crime in 
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of 
commission or substantially lessens the risk of 
detection. 
Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
Fleming detained his victim, Porter, for a 
substantial period of time, driving to two friends' 
locations and to several ATM locations before 
finally letting him go near the Fairpark, miles from 
where the incident began. The detention was not 
slight or inconsequential. Nor was it merely 
incidental to the crime of aggravated robbery 
because the initial robbery had been completed in a 
matter of minutes. Additionally, the detention was 
not of the kind inherent in a robbery. Typically, a 
robbery is of short duration, the detention only long 
enough to complete the taking of items. Finally, to 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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the extent the detention facilitated continued acts of 
larceny by going to cash machines, the detention 
had independent significance because it made these 
crimes "substantially easier" by providing transport 
to the machines and assuring that Porter gave the 
correct PIN to enable the withdrawals. It also 
significantly reduced the risk of detection because 
Porter could not report the incident to the police 
while detained. Thus, the detention was 
substantially independent of the host crime, and 
therefore supported a separate charge of aggravated 
kidnaping. Because the charges would not merge, 
there was no ineffective assistance of counsel in 
failing to move for merger. 
Finally, Fleming asserts trial counsel mishandled 
the trial by failing to effectively cross-examine 
witnesses and by introducing evidence that favored 
the prosecution. In essence, each of the issues raised 
regard trial strategy. The record demonstrates that 
the choices made by trial counsel in his tactics, even 
introducing evidence now second-guessed, were 
reasonable choices. As a result, Fleming fails to 
show ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Fleming argues that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to impeach Sharon Thompson, a key witness 
and participant in the cash machine transactions, 
with her immunity deal from the prosecution. 
However, Thompson's testimony was favorable to 
Fleming as well as to the State. She testified that 
Porter gave her his PIN and permission to use the 
card, that she never saw a weapon or heard Fleming 
threaten Porter, and that Porter got in and out of the 
car several times. Given that her testimony was 
critical to the defense, it was a reasonable strategic 
choice not to impeach her with her immunity deal. 
It appears such impeachment would have been 
counterproductive. 
*3 Likewise, the introduction of the "tool" found on 
Fleming when he was arrested and the receipts from 
the cash machine transactions were based on sound 
trial strategy. The tool was introduced in an effort to 
impeach Porter's credibility by inferring he later 
tailored his story based upon the tool the police 
found. The receipts were introduced to show the 
lack of receipts from the gas station, where Porter 
testified he purchased gas, supporting Fleming's 
tim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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story that Porter was there to buy drugs. In short, 
there was a reasonable trial strategy behind these 
choices, and thus, there was no ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Fleming asserts that trial counsel also erred in 
failing to argue particular points to the jury. Some 
of these assertions are factually incorrect and all are 
without merit. In sum, Fleming has failed to "rebut 
the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy/'State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, K 19.As a result, he has not 
demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
Accordingly, Fleming's convictions are affirmed. 
Utah App.,2005. 
State v. Fleming 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 2234837 (Utah 
App.), 2005 UT App 394 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
M 0 8 2007 
Attorney Pro Se j£ •3'Wk C/3 fa& 
lh THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
cvh4 3, We+nU 
Petitioner, ? 
VS. 
TcU\ to&£- *oUL~ Public cleX^djSq 
Respondent£* 
* 
* 
PETITION FOR RELIEF 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 0& 
Appellate Court No. OtfQc7Q(l£U> 
II. 
2. 
3. 
NAME OF RESPONDENT: 
"^onWction of Felony: State of Utah 
Conviction of Misdemeanor: County of 6>/HJr L^fc^ 
u v i 
Conviction of Misdemeanor: Municipality of: ^stfJ-LM<&- CfTt* 
IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT AND RELATED CASES 
1 (a) Name of court that entered the judgment of being challenged: (b). Location of Court: 6 4 t r - i ^ C a t ± 
(c). Case Number: 0^,{P\00^. ^ 7 P^> * 
Date of Judgment boing challenged: 
Sentence: 
CD 
2. Date of judgment being challenged: fly^fc ^) P T - ^ .OfyW 
3. Sentence: A Q Y W ^ x / f x ^ A fce^Wru - \ a t $ec*ft>g, ^ - W ^ J A»A ^ 
\ 4. Nature of offense involved (all counts):~X y /A^ Qift*frfe<^ (V^wyi tC^Wk/^ru 
Acf.v Cftfc^ A<J<WA LHcaftfr p r o ? feci -
5. What was your plea? (Check One) 
J^Not guilty 
D Guilty 
D No Contest 
D Guilty and Mentally ill 
D Not guilty by reason of insanity 
6. If you entered a plea of guilty to some counts, and a not guilty plea to other counts, give your 
plea to each count: 
7. If you pled not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity, was the trial before a 
Injury D Judge 
8. Did you testify at the trial? 
D Yes &No 
9. Did you appeal from the conviction or sentence? 
^ Y e s D No 
10. If your answer is "yes," provide the following information: 
2 
L Completing Form: L*>fiJ i>T*si / € <-j fle,im * **f Person'
Address:C-U'C-J-T /%-6c>^ 5 5 o (*%AW'&OI* Ltf, "frtfUJY 
Telephone Number: 
Bar Number: 
(a) Name of Appellate Court: (jt.f^U, £<> i v T o-C Av?-ej\\% 
(b) Case number: a a n y n f i ^ f ^ - C ^ 
(c) Result: A » J H J < » A 
(d) Date of result or citation of opinion: (JA»J \9t. &Gt>*> 
(e) Grounds raised: ^<fr fe fie-^^rl F^r iv\*.-tfrjJitf+. A*&if«nLjC 
(f) Did you seek farther review of this appeal? 
£^es D No 
(g) If your answer is "yes," provide the following information: 
(1) Name of Reviewing Court: 7kf 6nffanv£.Ciux*\. +*l D*t> &h*4p A-f \pTA.\n, 
(2) Case number:ftppjS'Q^^-&C, ant>f & g l o * C A , om^notJ-ZI 
(3) Result: Q r i u ^ d 
(4) Date of result or citation of opinion: FeftftiA/tfcu L« j S-Qr*/^ 
(5) Grounds raised: ZfaefFFCrlt,/^ A&<-{* md>e, A-f C^n^dfJ 
3 
11. If you did not appeal from your conviction or sentence, why not? 
12(a). Other than your direct appeal from your conviction or sentence, have you filed any 
petitions, applications, or motions with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state or 
federal? 
D Yes JB'fro 
(b) If your answer is "yes," provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case number: 
(3) Result: (4) Date of result or citation of opinion: 
(5) Grounds raised: 
(c) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application, or motion? 
• Yes J2(No 
(d) Did you appeal tta, decision on your petition, application, or motion? 
D Yes /^No 
(e) If your answer is "yes," provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case number: 
(3) Result: 
(4) Date of result or citation of opinion: 
4 
Person Completing Form: L^fJi f^l-c^y^1 *Ck 
Address: C-U-C^ Po'&zf SSO C*uJtrtiQ&4 ucr, -gV&>3f* 
Telephone Number: 
Bar Number: 
(5) Grounds raised: 
13(a). Other than the case described in question 12, have you filed any further petitions, 
applications, or motions with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state or federal? 
D Yes pffao 
(b) If your answer is "yes," provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case number: 
(3) Result: 
(4) Date of result or citation of opinion: 
(5) Grounds raised: 
(c) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application, or motion? 
D Yes
 /fe^f o 
(d) Did you appeal the decision on your petition, application, or motion? 
D Yes J^fco 
(e) If your answer is "yes," provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case number: 
(3) Result: 
5 
(4) Date of result or citation of opinion: 
(5) Grounds raised: 
14(a). Do you have any petition, appeal, or motion now pending in any court, state or federal, 
relating to the judgment being challenged: 
D Yes KNk> 
(b) If your answer is "yes," provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case number: 
(3) Nature of proceeding: 
III. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: YOU MAY BE BARRED FROM PRESENTING 
ADDITIONAL GROUNDS IN A FUTURE POST-CONVICTION PETITION IF YOU FAIL TO 
PRESENT ANY GROUNDS THAT YOU COULD PRESENT HERE BUT DO NOT. 
THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE MOST FREQUENTLY RAISED GROUNDS FOR 
RELIEF IN POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS. EACH STATEMENT PRECEDED BY A 
LETTER CONSTITUTES A SEPARATE GROUND FOR POSSIBLE RELIEF. YOU SHOULD 
RAISE IN THIS PETITION ANY OF THESE GROUNDS THAT APPLY AND ANY OTHER 
GROUNDS NOT LISTED THAT YOU MAY HAVE AVAILABLE. 
DO NOT MERELY CHECK THE GROUNDS LISTED. IF YOU BELIEVE ANY OF THESE 
GROUNDS APPLY TO YOU, YOU MUST ALLEGE FACTS. THE PETITION WILL BE 
RETURNED TO YOU IF YOU MERELY CHECK A GROUND AND FAIL TO LIST 
NECESSARY FACTS OR ATTACH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION. 
(a) Conviction obtained by plea of guilty that was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily 
with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. 
(b) Conviction obtained by use of coerced confession. 
(c) Conviction obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and 
seizure. 
6 
Person Completing Form: 
Address: 
Telephone Number: 
Bar Number: 
(d) Conviction obtained by use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest 
(e) Conviction obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the 
defendant evidence favorable to the defendant. 
(g) Conviction obtained by a violation of the protection against double jeopardy. 
(h) Conviction obtained by action of a grand or petit jury that was unconstitutionally selected 
and impaneled. 
(i) Denial of effective assistance of counsel. 
(j) Conviction under an unconstitutional statute or constitutionally protected conduct. 
(k) Denial of right to appeal. 
15. State concisely every ground on which you claim you are entitled to post-conviction relief. 
Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach additional pages 
stating additional grounds and facts supporting same. 
(a) GROUND ONE: c^ned fa^ //7/^ fZiCfkfe tr/rf** j/Ucc&Aj Ce 
SUPPORTING FACTS FOR GROUND ONE (state briefly without citing law or making argument): 
1" 
7 
\ \ 
fc^/*,,^/ / Crn+A-) 
A Lor^enA, "J^cS^decf &(%&<&*&_ 
•Ai.fl>M UIL^ rurusH^A ^ rjLAtteut'KL i*^Pi<» es^vudl m^-hiit^d 4arst4^&z <3-£></«-A 
Uta*a j _^ L _ 
t> ^etfz-^a . Je-hh^&cfj r.cn>i&m&<i en. H^.j^^^pm4^^TU^^uzjidC 
hecjim^tSL TZv^e plo<>**\?***ck$> A-m>. e~l&**ie*ir^ /*A—sj£ft Let _ 
#., The. Ah&*<4. i^ *?r.M>. V& PiAii* Qdifi-en owe* £.eAj>\p^Mol<> (JLnM*~j 
LI &£*. P. &Ae* tf Cfi!) CUxrJ ?>Otrdm 
v*\e^h>\*> 
s T^£ /^(free*dr&rth tAjfoole C-rt*?e LAJA*, kuil-f- cm ~Ttuz . 
CrAoustd I CVg-vrf-./ 
glisJ Thi ZTrj&L/t bj?c^&u*)Q. 77T&Y yyihletilalLj /fr4*„ £DS nu*<J 
CJOU id^r h eJ i R^> Tk l~y \)A Kii?c/Jf- S y U Ahjcfe^d- cou lA 
Ciryn^rf~~ /)o uitf-crnct loe,MufitP U.a. (J^A^ L OS. /$- By Cf 
C&ridctcrf- .OPCTA [i&ig T&> '~Th <fJ~ F^j-t-Hn. Q.nd I4f7its&t*,i~hf . 
kL 
- f-U tvH*SLiG^ ^•h4-J-U.~fzn£.\J IQA4(<> - f e n /J2.<=,<5#A iftfJur£.0<rf fAr&*1*;& 
v
 X^ t ' i ^ i i ^ nA&t-^-Tko. hoJ/ou})^j /4K%L L&^e* i^cludeJ 
(^eyv\p\n<W& 4-cfdeA) 
*]Ac,ci/iAiJA--l-fA fQolnlooj2<4^ LQ^*,P^ i^LcluALrf ^ffk^^e< fi* ^ 
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^
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T^4J?\ tu^d iZccLe 3£><&) ^^^a*g_ {\jn-f~~t7b / f r ^ / L ^ JT~**,4. 
\Mi^fjp-nau,cf~g^5 **si U loo-A'aCMSec( L^-4-e*. <x^A /*£> 
fi,Ao\**. Ul^7 fnnofS<2.*vg& "fa *- •3^-f- n-+ CJA^^I,<^ i s usl^cXn. Of^Q 
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u> hole, y _ L 
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&snd Tin.o*4 A-/4* irnsH<4jt<i't>+l lc> \U&- / 4 ^ / f v ' / ^ r f 
risJljjU* " ' ' , " . 
^g-frgfou-S Ipodflu lisi-iU.Au ULficm *<h^crH^^ '(JufatcX* ?4 AJQ~f~~ 
flA^&ttryi &•£ The. ^Jjy^Mj—&sisidL art—-h> ^\unje^[jhrrri^li^ Ccnn-pt.i'iJl— =—I no. sjc> *.4 ifrt i t rt ±zs—/ tnfe^t\TTL(m^i1/y c ry\f 
TUP. plv\G.*3£>. 'l^ wu*,p I/Red asucf) \<9 &¥n'i44ecf \rt 'i^^T^ur^-rm 
J~7, i,o H-QTA faxJL-JUcite ec i TU.P p%*.Trftc?>i'G* &^*cX. Cfry-rfti<,<*ot 
$Q rt**cm,Ma\+ d&U lair ^ W?cn<^j (3ee ^^.3J 
(^t&usuA I Cri^JLJ 
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i—i 
GTL&^VJL ) CyViiJbl 
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^AriAicn^e.ifi^. A~h*Utt, T & / V i ^ f t f ^ j - e!>/.ria^UjiL yf^^H^n^-h 77u? 
y ,^^^4^1^(4-4-^1 *yi./rr*. ^h-^^i /*>s\C&. S>^+>L£ TVlL^t Jbqf^iQ 
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CrAou^A. I frAW*-") 
GJAJ>Q-£T\*? C-^-yi^cr* lp&- LC^mcn.ocl £..t~H^L\\ 
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up tin A^M crv^J? err ~t%4> ^su^e^^l dcCfe^ia+dfr ^^4~^rxri^ 
yH^nrhCj ^Hn-M £>4- Th£** Q ' ^ ^ T7-g t^faj TV*->j t^uu&Aji 
TUJ? ^"hzuctfusffrl a^-Qcn M^.o\M>^\ ho^\.o^n^\ TA<L ccmuich'rrn 
_y g^irv / OCjA-L[^ 
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SUPPORTING FACTS FOR GROUND TWO (state briefly without citing law or making argument): 
TLA& 
(c) GROUND THREE: j^d utol+t+J U.&d*. P A*L * <' ' " " 
SUPPORTING FACTS FOR GROUND THREE (state briefly without citing law or making 
argument): 
XAoU-ki^C erf U*j2-C& P AuJP* *-/, rh& ^^^n^<rh&r\ /\n~b 
Cn^t^f CGrnf*4-tnjH$ ?wjyiaftes\ nam ^ l ^ f t W r r r y lsh^t&&f£- £cn 77ug 
A^GAG (/i^terf f/tr/*L&l0fi4>7& j r\*.r^Up*\ /AS £r\* '^cjpdtnfisf Joy -P*c$~ 
Cn n ^h^j fp 4mjAe**cPf 7 f-k*A -+UCL ^JO^QL^CL^LJA^ fa.*A J-frj? 
(d) GROUND FOUR: Counsel iVi »ir>U-Pt™ *>£ T 7 ^ & <z*^> J^Th ^^*^cf^^ 
SUPPORTING FACTS FOR GROUND FOUR {state briefly without citing law or making " 
argument): 
w Ousrt^sdlj A /SWrt? •JIPJAJ CLWJI iQi^L 
(^ccr^hjsJ — j y o ^ ) 
(5) 
(rnOij^xc^ ^2. CrrnsxJl-J 
~TUJL r t h~kcmsiO> Would Arfar> / j L> ~/A<? Cni/X$~ -hr> k& 
-cL 
Tin16 C/h^fi ?*> _ 4- cX/4-t*4 de&\ rt,cry& tg4<?« f7\& ^ 7 ^ / e . 
JTZlfcC jo jol/Uf jint*> l3VU &4rsd_<&ch , , , , , , „ ~-,r, 
yicrtr i&AM ~Hvrt- "f h& /hg-fln u)fr*, -£?-£&-
 t ^ A & ^ v rcr\le>\ 
MVK. €. j-^h^i 
h>. R i-e>\ ^j>.cacjinrr^A ^4- I^JA-^ -P^f^o \s\r^-f- "if Plaice. Yen HH. iff^co^jnir^ri t-h LQ4-** -^srtz? Ice.^r -4. 
cnr\ Y\[I>Y\ j l ^ U <gr$UM>ie.£> ^be^~ <4-^ ^P u.*4gh <d.AttJi*iG 4~l<ua 
C/h# Ci/^JL A-lo-f- l^^cl ^d/ffed cm ~Mg -^/cr&eL hqsH<?rQj 
[AJA^ C^m*hiA&A&At 
CAiAli/^l^L^ x \AAtA, PonitA l& LOS j In fa jO/ht&r^r, /-ftp &**$ 
"T&vnpl-e d&e&S ~hh4£e,xiri# 4~lr^e CouL& be. ^Q^)(ou^ 
(T7) 
l-/)<7> CfaUfcb 0L<*TJL bS0U U df^seJajOO <sP*Yrm*> - £ U » ^ ) / y 
fa(\a\evn?» ^4-t) i^cll A-j, fa */s> l-t^*^ JVi A"T^ > Z . p £ <*.).££(# 
C/rry?i0a\AJL4A£&£> yi^U_ -&**&__ ^ O T I . ^ > / i i ) i 6 -C^cr™ jsC*/** 
to up pen Ud -H/u& ^H/\si£i&h. &<*e (AM-fnott 4^7-jiirt>icm*j / 4 * * P / ) ' 
U <~>Ue clirl t^icrf A-gA-viA j^p '^UstOfA-ku* /tod y A v W 
A-y\ (y "T-rl* A 
JSZ-
1*JL,4>. infill T f e ^ < ^ f i A C77^ / ^ ^ f *2- TV» / ^ 7 Cy. ^7-
C^iou^A &I7rr* 4J 
,JZ J2J>Q(AJ>^T -H-yt CptAsdt -ha T*k*, UiJrLc't/h/ f\o4rce &f -f^U 
{rn. f°\ (Jvi<4f f?_e tenrQ^ A^A &'L<,
 J /2&liG/lu<> '/K^-He^^j ^-j^fuA^j 
A^<£ ^ M F^cM^ frnd 4Lifida+it£> />l&*»&*\,4€rl AsisiJl 
oC-U u=* L : 
~7Vu<U /X /fcCuf^A^/f hw J^icifiQ^Lf 4<>J,&>J-ecf ^TudCz^,^ c^aP 
~*siJ I )s\CS : .+, ^ / -4- D9S* ^L£> *->,, ytJ^I S> 'SI A r . Lrf- .^l-fsisd' *T^L / V (ls\J? ^  C^-ri iSitgcec 
i - a 
£rtA#u>vie§ ^ CCJ>*Y4- ) 
\ l 
£>>»-?-
C&I^J?O^-) Ji4Jrvvie* (^erj3ife-6u& n^^L./!**£, <<4dIi* jtolcm^*^ 4TQ\ 
77ug^2g. jA^^t^ fyi*m+4 Cqy\Aj&4dbCJ7crriS i"\ -4&&-frUicn>i*j ~t-t&crk 
5*& P~r~~pq 11- /-tr&» ft-ZO LQ ^&Jl. < Le risque ^ ; X y ^*uQ ,-f-
tAjA^b 
VfVJ &+• die**)** cnr\ 4ixe diz^J} e*uQ^ <%fh>Qizh < ^hh'lkt P&JCn«ii<<hP~i 
*?b?eeF-j l-h. ^/H£L h> d'tcQ h<4- <jp.$- •+£<* ^ ^ U+dzt /h~f4^ 
li^eX^fe^H^i {\\C\(J2J> u& - f^i /^ CtX^i^jp. ^Is\^f2<y^rs Thfnn/3^rH 
(•rit>-r^%*.Al 0 C^JtryctJ 
U&CL*lrK>i <*2J2& & I f^f* (I—I? - ' 
j^o. L\>.c (in -f£fl polled fa/%rCT~i CcmfAOa. TT"/^ ^n IJ^L^ 2JD~ZI 
(P) Pcn4&i cJt4ttn5 Tn j^ii-fi^/ s,fe^^^^^'^^^/%^^&7>M^i 
fo Jr\ P"T~ f* (0 L^^/^-1% aw&. ~r^/><f 7o U*A- Q.*s~*~Jl joont 
(& /U--rhf/ic,^c1 t I^LA 14-/.C" PrrtU* ^-hrheS -hb^-^J^j^^u^ 
A- \/lfri 4ro -H\9 .Art ltd> ^r /spf-r 
f j / t W J ^ I f g ^ •<4ryy?[ AQ^T^f t^-^^d A ^ *^L ^ . 
<-\r5* 
(p Tkt A^cc^^CM^tfr\ £-*-/? \<+i£*c£ ~T~kjL- t^>A.(m<l &}j2*^j2~rf<s. erf- 77^J> 
CQ. It>&> L,y*£x. 3~*T; 
Or h. u& -Pfficn*\ ^ g T n w ^ -hh-+>4— '$f&++4^ P<r>4&\ U.W& h^idxiha 
T7->& ZYX^-t i^ A^t^X- ^ kgr- (tern-hlnjgu^ly h sfyQ^/tedl &-n InX* (<& P faj 
^jk#-x.'&r\ tjfjt .A- )4.\A TVO"^ loPlrta /-vugIn l<-j /Vis\rfyjpljojg^i'i&fe 
^ ) .-X i^ t/iit/i^tJ^Cj - f ^ g fyuOsjt+llAnc* OtJLcLn - f i f r ^ frk> " 7 - / / ^ 
Lt£\- Pnoup ^ ^ i / ^ W ^ ) 9ton o^ &,KJUy ji/ai/ ^y^ 2#<P3_^ 
^*4- Pj~^ pa (<? f^JLlfit ~TA\Q- ~T2>^v>stesh*-H* ^ T C ^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ 
Cn^A-zSm*) 
cSt^Q \Q<pjn*H***& At. L*JA^ t^i *~>&Czh I *<t-te>
 t "Thlf> A<+*> is. 
*B=*. 
f
^t:U^i i / 
Q) -fen Ituvi -h> h^h^e. 1-Q.-C4- A4- ^OO -P&crrH /houtQ h^jc^K^a 
Ut?^ C£ufd vt<rt~ <%£%~^ ~h> $Qt4nn-tvL<.rr\ S^L^h L^ko /*>Cb< 
r$h>p*l \h +kQ'^T^^iox+Hz3 qifo ~ht<*r><, *rfr<rn **-Th*L 
1-11 cm 7 3 ^ 5 , "BOO €**j-
ann -hi fh7^1 *,eu-f-f/i ho frnQ A& d Lc-kacG f^a 
^TK& Ar£.-£grnBA\ 
Q) n^M-^ l-C- ~H** rniu^dh f^9r-j,,0J) n.n4p-. -4-U^d- A,>. cdtJnirf- S^^rQ 
TV 
*(?*i«cQ &(}&<&,. pjc.U C4JI ^In-^i^cm OISISWSL- Wi&ko dJJL TZig 
W ^ , , £?h>4*8-cry\ Usfi^y <dt€c>j0p&.cf! crf^^ "The. f^e^H~f7cryio^i i-u/ZS. 
s& 
.4+- b<**f-j J^CL * -
 : - -
C&<JSM<Z,J?. \ /x^-4^- -X^?^ ^4A-<3rTTu<. -k-n yierh A M ^ - ^ ^ . -hh (^ 
\P<?4i-irrma^ -Cibg^rf ^aovzA 0± &\&U~f- -/T> surf- &l*fth? ^U^ce v 
(%&rMjsiAd 2 - C*£c£y£/ 
Thfifi- U<L fol*Pl*>pJ-P W*** A- BY U ^Qn^^^f^ .^h/o^<j 
fcXfehVnC ^PA^cmW Ctn- Initio* LT&** ) &-£ - f A g , ^^A^j-f^j 
T'h&'j- -fUfd— Cj.O-G-^ hs4~rtd. f l h-4*td KAffh J^^-7^vr^22^«=, 
^CT7lA*Avu.inft l<Vt&Q~h&, ^ 
^-p /^H<.^e , &£--Jfp&^ u/^h^i -the- ~^Tti/0<-f f/tS&S I'/n^f&csrJecv 
doukl- G^rb Cn. ^+kl>- 757s^ts-f irjoj t^jj^rC -j-fajfJ- (-/^£>^^. 
cms 
-QASJT*? USA*? MfaFncff^Sto ha Zi'j&h <rr+- -f-LojCie- ^4-70L^~knQ^( 
#3D na 
Gnousrdl "Z- C?'^rirf- J 
\A/aulA A4/OC*J> • . 
"5> ThM- W\&. iPcnif* US'*** Kr.An&ppfd AixrJ tfebhedj 
6- 1V\M— m+i\&>\e- {,u<4^ J*. CjfA\r*& <2~P s&ny ~Hr/& Ca?i*tti"H*<ch 
4. Th*<-/)p+. \/ti<4rUl\ -ZlUl-G&t 
4>- TlnM- \/)f\*0. fic^le^ -£^U^trx^4*r>f -4-hp r^iLo/p d Jxrzy -JSP: L 
Jy\e4eed- ht<=? dmi-hem ^j4~ / ? y (A <4nc$ ttn -fha. TJnu^cl^ 
A- fd y g ^ > . -j-n Li y?& &fd & ye^uo fn 11 £p •^£^n k^ie* 
)PpAiAi,crn£>s\ dicf /^Crh
 Kj£oh &n Kir[rT4y&j4 -Hii*, 
A d IAA,L*he,?J>) . 
X 
d^mi^r]^ 3> £V^ryi-f J 
"^IAJ*. Pesfl&pTTjp^ejS' Tti~Cm isn.-&4ira*i fcr*irf?*-frmc}—f^> 
j/t)ln\^Ai4 jA>k^ A A-f>L-Tn -H^A-H-^ -fi<i.jd?t— rt.jpjj4L&- f^j AJ^OLA^ueA^r 
•HJ? 
Y\O4-TCQ <?A-i^e- cJrtAj?&e *Ann X ^ - ^ ^ W r r ^ i /H^j Coyrhhi^ 
en Q<n^&~h24*c$^ /Hne^ct^ncj *JT~ &<*? -five ^&cj&d^^utt ;^^i&?^9^^ c 
P*-4nh 
USA?? A*sici/2jtt&&-fec( Ip^ofPef^S. <ff-P 7^fe, ' / ? f e ' f f ' g f - /$-*q. 
/[AiAhA?. ThPcfu* (L&AAU>*> rx/i^rX / ? y j , - / / ^ n^^o^ ~hj^oenj^ /J>A*I> 
A. 
'US&i heAnCj CJhA^aecf UJIfA Sheriff -*Hr<)~r\ ZT ^fk^/y USsfs z^-3 
3 ~s 
OrAlXJuJ 1 Oh^rP) 
-22 
tru?JJL^t>^. *His*4-
/-?&< 
TU.i 
7 % ^ <^ >Py?j? n£H~' l~&AA&* Cnc-luA&t O-£&*T^><; -Or-, ~H^L ^ ^ 7 
^ o 4 ?> lrrr*r(-J 
?***. -tfn.M- 47i**c&> -Hn^ h^yi/iQ^m j -hyuL CMA^J&CI CJA\ »**£<> 
JHjzl Ut£-£<zJP.
 L W ^ f ^ &.ejt*£.£AtfoU s>*,'t^eJl s4^ J/1S>JI-J^C{,<UUI 
\r\-Gru^ri4^a7-[ . \Q<TH\ \^IAJ^ £WUfMo+&~7*\ -h(n^ (y?<>r^&{Z?j , 
d*iri(&& &A<l*>efi4.*4<:. cii£££,\*4*y frv>c&&e& ej9/le£tWI/y t+J-i&e 
"The- aoLfdr W^
 t4^***'f~ -JrUfi ^(-iA*L*ie@sh&sC$~ 
. . D^./JJ. l J LP /i J J. > . ^ . ^ / - _ . ~n -u - / 
^Xg^ihpMr^jdrri J1 i/fe 4r WIG -H&~ CfPit^( 14>i ^&i.-€n wrkem G#!2. 
^ - &f- ^ 7 «?*-» u/^t» -rA^^P Ami* An^a*ic£sn<i*dh ~ho te^o +&e 
&-
—J*--* %* vr r i * W£_J *•••- i —w-—^ L_£ ^^ • ' *r 1 r l i s --r-y* *^ y-g^r i r i*m v jr~r i r ^ <r—~~ — , 
^ay^iZ^ &£- A 4-Utv& -hzt^l A^xeQ -j-be f-n?/x?-7 l^j**t nod- -f^ag 
Tk* ^^^f-W-en
 0O\nFi Atf-JnMLf filAmly e##oci* 
gC- cms pd-n4&*A— J£JI0LL70OJ3, <de^j&\ iZn ^~tl^^ CcmMzd^*, 7 
~Hn^ ~Hli^ e>h\H6U^ <rj£/>rjn ~~t*>n*f- ^ 4 v V > 4^dL^y A^Jl-flcr^^ 
J 
o,l 
/XatHi,#l£> ¥ C J±£>n*J- 2. 
^TUi> t-jo^l-e^co tAA^Aj>x -j-fio M L i a t ^ i v i ^ yUi^^^»n<^y i fir Kit/*i P. 
,AiUUj^\-teS en i/H-c^-fifcl * A l ± f e 4 f l<o4^-> &MA*A <n^ l^e^me.— 
f*C-¥Thi 
1 dug UXQ^iU^ 
( ^ . r f » 4 , C ^ i A ^ . U . -\^L{J J-^JL- 4 - P told **!£> e 4- "fzg> (V-l^4lP ur£rsns>^ J ^ J 
_£ 
tVl 771f>^ >M g 3 ^ w ^ - - f i ^ ' ^ d -A? #_Q£H,Q%-1~<± &S// Q r£=: 
TJW* «& Acta 
f(H<^£MpTc*?n '-Heinle*** 
Tib 
^o^J} H fe>rl- ) 
Cplsfrriq** {V\4-eL&. -Hn^ou^WoLdh -fho V > g / V / <^t^AL -t£j? 
^y C,o CAS***4 I -f<*A feci T4? olg+jecj- 4^r> "Ah* *tO^Lo-fi^s*^** 
r>j#)hL0£> a^^ar^p^ <^J>J> J^da^d-,™* JL 1-7 2n ??- ^^ ?A
 r 
The, fo (AM~ *6 r\ vu (A 1&2- ^yvZftA-G*,/ ~JAn**A- ^-H-0-7i^tu^ <> 
T7> -H^e„ ZTJ^-I**, 1 
Al^Q 4-U*S'<Z£><Asd- A lentil A ho pAi*»A-Gt* I Th^h UUkp^, <10£^iJ*Z 
/lcA~UH-fh4J-^hnAjAO (lL£>£t»^s>cTJ> ^ n M > M C , ^ -^J».//L^o_ 4ri tbL^^A~ 
4-r> Y*JZJ&+C&- MSHAL &><z -f-^tjn-f LLA-TCJL UJLD^Q A^ o / n *, / ^ t^rfz 'a-^<. 
/nfczh+fr: AUt> UH*J ^ • ^ A <4TO~£. -esnArk&L^ 
u.G. c±.P:ituJL / 7 ^ ^ l 
iA)^cnnCi Weuirj ^/rn^>4i4xdt* n^toAA^cArT^e A^^fyh+yrc^ a±i 
n*sis& AvzJ-j %~7j iyL. \^LJ> cfkjtk 4. + 
) -P.A-rUA AH, 
Ccm yj-T-fiiJ-i o-H 4^ i/iofrt-hlpn^ Wi*> QAi^^Jh ^ K - ^ - A ^ T S o^o-fc^s^ 
\jQVjbrff &AAfi<e*j*uAA Aj^>^> efAtn-6* ^le-A** ^£>le- -H»<4A- ~71SJP 
I4^4tspsi£y*JL COU-AJI- L\A^ 4/HA -Hns+J—Tte Qufijsherr*- AS )nn~h 
GJUIUM B&2: A+H&i u.>JA<tfr eA&cA-Tin**? p^Ar^, J^gJ? & 
2J 
y*tfr\<^ *"* Icfcrr4- ) 
~TU& •JTZif*'/ g^J2 A~£? <r\ USLA Job 1* Un ,>f^?^'-g Jhtoyte* Cair^ucff 
(Q Cgu^fcg.7 4~<+ttjL& "fa> ^ f 1 " ^ f*i"i'"ii|li \(f\\-\ r " r / r fftu 
-fKft. &-j&weArd-<> fit-^4— *5uAJlcn hfo cn<4i iSMcrficrri to _ 
Ivrh&?($ucfi.O-Y\ c£r &u>tJl&i>ice jtn his d?-•£&*&& , CRLX^^^I i/n<+*<,<$l*<dt(dl 
fe lp[/K^- &>vi}Jl -tfv>. Astern Lrt. ArlU^ecf/i.j fcidtrttyA&d)&*«dl 
i6y^ 44rjrQa*dP- ,J)LS> LL*nO -J-ksLOt^q k /site* 4-~&e?f-A^ ^J? 
nec/ustx^ 2.
 < L 
)/\r\A-vy\A *>o hf 
*UJ4$ fdhllt, JQAXJG.. QtW., OIJJ2>L eA/e*>i4&l CL-UIJ} T£ flatted 
•4-rn oiP^(rm\n*44-Tcrn OJ/^A. h.Ai-4- jAjatdd fas> JL~t)S , l~h& 
^lohpcufcn m*J) ZTudae /Mo. y£How4~i?lw L./& &««<$ j3Y^/ 
fc Av\ LPS cj&lfetje. oo jQu-fa- SI -t-'Z. '-fa>c^xH^A a^tJl l-t-
@9 in 
finntj^iQ <-) ((*y<L4-) 
ft4~ -Hsu.*? ^zA-^j-k.^ J^ >fl^ty &./**<£' 37isi,f tAjZ-ft^J C'S *Aie,CJcr»rirJ rH-» 
TVue TSl^xi
 t TLg>Lfl USZ^JL, yio. to /«4^£s£> <*-yi -/A-i *=^^"fc <^^»^ 
^ l / g ^ i In cV» -hru.* fr-P- -Hnc** ^fh&te- L-c»(44n /ZPCJ/MC(^> 4-& /V-? 
ft; r„ 
t n LJjhlcb TJ^eJ pt^lO^PjCJuXan QtiP^hicn^OcC /l^x? n^suQ £jJ>h&>4~\ 
h^h^ ~HIJ> jntsstdLo^i err- fa.&rfi. -&4-i I-erf i ra A^IPSSX&I*.$~ sf- A At*v\*. 
C\f\AiifreA> £*jp*-_ Cnot^^c^ 1 <4~nr£ ^ 
/\ in ~!TL\A4- 4 W t^J^^A/hscr a±w^s\ nu)n£>A AA~ 4-UP -/y^j? 
>?^t 
Ml** yUifK 
; y . I i - . ^ ' . J I I II i l l 1 llll ill I • .id. r . L 
QCHAJ^^»\ *> Li fits A A lnA~i+*- GgJrUrrx docAxn** fiJ^pcrA*?—aisic?-
-fen A pA^"i}^A^, jV> l MAA\ <^^TTD 4* l^o^STr^^NL. 
f ^ f ^ r y ^ i ^ W ^ > » , i f c & Lki L\X^ ^re^Ai 
<z& 
(J4) Cfrusnhsj -Q-ft(,\rJ! ~h& .AnPcivup., A^Ai^.^-tho Lie** jn(A /^^fJh^ 
jyuw)*£ kx^ct h^O j4- bee^n i-f-u>e*riJl \A.^H^JP keen - H ? M - » ^ 
T A I c$sn>UA d-&G4 dZCrr^e IOAJI CteJ^i^i^e. dt^A-iOiJiuia 
~ti\.iL' Csi£.MAA,\,Yi,fr\ jyyQow^v^nerrs OL^L^L -(? f^t /u^ue ~j~z> / /Ot^^fyo 
y^y\xj *?&mlal4yirJL c^~ ^- rJfi4kj^^P '-f-bfiinuf* a^k^c, uji"^rue*& '— ^tviAj ^^mkOl^vui crtr ^- ae-tefTig y^j2^}Hy a^Ktnc- ujr 
Clb 
GnfavL*^* *4 (f%£+) 
-H\i pj^^As a^J& COC*.<*T>*J ci7c9 no^~.444&t*t/orf ^a /^4^^<?ec3 
AV\JU vLfrhx&tt fip^Ario-rJlA fo<?\j^&lfcJ lu k# ^-hr*? cje^ths 
tsJWirh LA? ou\d }n*<hjJL top&vy Q&hip* 4-tJ Ve^s/zVy -j-o -HUL 
NV
 uicJnionb* A&mQ&nen Wc_. <yi Avu^ &4- fa7*> /B\y iu ^,r-i%^^( 
4rf*-PP -fg> I bok- Tn^ 4-U&. xx \./LcJ-iM.<;r/fapM*4is/o*4 o^~6r ha:)/ 
WL\Jo\(Jtnfj Cn ^(JL^plo^cms &£- Afi-fU&f/WSstt,? <T7 j &A+4r<r*?<4J 
-fUrg. "A^> 7~C fcn&u.?j ZTL drrr\J- j/fiauLX~l-€- "H^7^ ^^^rr-n 
(IP CQu^i^e-P hrfi//l& -P^-f LcCj a *> ^-f/h-kd Maou^Lj h^ £<+( Lcf -fa> 
L.4~t <\ jyi&ft£/i ~G?L*^ckA4~tcn<i -£g-\ ~Hv> rrt^arxesr-frern err- /)o (PC?«4<«*i 
/tf>-Q. ^Qp^rA twine ^rbecnnc-ZA "f4i^^\ I "h.^^fu^f)^ JA.M^> 
•feetW&x 
> Ti- -JTPU&J TV\,M—hka 6>^Wes C*4*?&. i*Jte, UM><IL^ <&*>X& U J P uut 
Qz^A^fo^A 
/Arl^WlCjjs) hf ^ * - ^ y - L^H^LJJ £.4<*J^ T*>C,LA-0 £i*{*sf /s\Q~4ffi a>/<.Af*t 
~ThM-\f> Anahtlptf-fcf IQ^ -fag. r^ryiU^z^-frmn iu<^- ?-T -f*gg-
\4-ftbcm r i n c l u d e d ^xTfKQ vN l^Ql^Udt m*rh*vrce'z> ^ r 
^ C -H-ia-t-g > S Vip cis.i^^x^e. -\-hQ(n~4 A-i/^JtzhlJ?y Cc>Urt<jS>J yyixj^h 
^.4-T^/, / hold -h^g- < ^ < ^ c C & ^ v ^ " * V / « ; hQ^Mj h(jsi/&P*r\ ct£-
^1A*J~ UM*? f\c-d- a imp j-^njtLi '— 
7\x. tfP..uhh-h -hi course) 4 LjAf^^^^^ b<~f -H^e drm^-h^xt-fr^y? 
.4 - LAU?U&A £LA/£SIS\ -{-lad 1*1 h ~Hr*L s^C c<.^>-PC/ y\n^-i—^-—^ 
IV 
G-flou^id ,jj_ (llr'a-rtfr.) 
t*ncf 
f-e^£-. ^&fi£i\ A-CCmA 4r™I<»f &o^j?*^^^^rT* IQU <r^>^4. 
C^rynptolr- de.Ce+t&e> 
CjTn^imJQfifitri fau Counsel -j-p p e r>> +£&- fin^^^rf' cr4~ ^ c*^£rrj2L 
h-
tip -h> h/frz* 
\u pWtM C\ *?lsm&'l\ k^nl-fe -Hjsff /^)A^ yi/rr J4*' /^tsfjtem AJlejedJy 
1
 -
J i!/lA4- ^ f g ^ g ^ ^rJ~i4^A ^filledj f^^TrJn b_i/fr UjJn#J-^/ 
AnsAlfre<& /^M. }fe rcm-k*cfe /?PA4~* 
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Person Completing Form: 
Address: 
Telephone Number: 
Bar Number: 
16. If any of the grounds listed above were not previously presented in any other court, state or 
federal, state briefly which grounds were not presented and your reasons for not presenting them: 
£ftore -G*okz iQcrCr rcdseA /*> jrkt id*&*e& on sf&P*cciJ huX* 
m^<fr/cLf Coun^eJ t*x*& i^rfPe&t-tr* for £QJ/L<»C 1t- fe^Sfr^tf^ 
~F$&-ujrmfi -fttr firfif^c( fTwi ^TQL^Y of ^heftt^X^&iA&s hem* r?zr& 
17. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who represented you in the following 
stages of the judgment being challenged. 
(a) Preliminary hearing: ^ohn / < ! W £ ^ ^ - <5 L-C, PuhL^t- dtffc*At>f 
(b) Arraignment and plea: iTalyi (<> , s^ie^t 
(c) Trial: I J ^ M ^ . W ^ t 
(d) Sentencing: 7$k\isi \^ tuJe&ir 
(e) Appeal: ^J^^Abf^tk i W l r SU^&fru^nt MZ-6U tATtf<j< Qs* Cfo ^ ^ W ^ J c o 
(f) Post-conviction proceeding: / J o DKV^ 
(g) Appeal from post-conviction proceeding: AJ^ o^*g 
18(a). Do you have any future sentence to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the 
judgment being challenged? 
D Yes life 
(b) If your answer is "yes" give the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Location: 
(3) Case number: 
IV. REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS 
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: IF YOU DO NOT ATTACH THE REQUIRED COPIES OR 
PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION WHY YOU CANNOT PROVIDE THEM, THIS PETITION 
WILL NOT BE FILED AND WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU. YOU MAY THEN LOSE YOUR 
Kb 
I 1*1 
RIGHT TO FILE A PETITION IF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRES BEFORE YOU 
FILE ANOTHER PETITION. 
19. Attach a copy of the following documents to this petition or provide an explanation why you 
cannot provide the copies. 
(a) The judgment and commitment being challenged. 
(b) Any decision issued by an appellate court from the direct appeal. 
(c) Any previously-filed petition for post-conviction relief, and any decision issued as a result 
(d) Affidavits, records, or other documentary evidence that support your claim. 
(e) An affidavit of impecuniosity and certificate from the Inmate Accounting Office, if you are 
requesting a waiver of the filing fee. 
(f) Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
V. PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
STATE OF UTA H , ^ 
COUNTY O F . ^ j s s . 
I, the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty of perjury that the information I have provided 
in this petition is true and correct. 
C^Jt^^ 
SIGNATURE OF PETITIONER 
SubscribejJ^and sworn to before me on: A Z ^ ^ > > ^£7, &Z?Ob 
NOTARY PUB 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: 
ROSE MARIE VAN DYKE 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
255 E 300 N PO BOX 898 
GUNNISON, UTAH 84(534 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
FEBRUARY 14, 2010 
STATE OF UTAH 
VI. CERTIFICATION O F ATTORNEY (If petitioner is represented by attorney) 
I certify I am the attorney for petitioner, and that this petition complies with Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY 
! / < / 
Addendum D 
FILES BISTRiCT COtUIT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 32007 
OUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL S. FLEMING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent• 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 070901186 
Pursuant to the Minute Entry entered by the Honorable Joseph Fratto 
on February 12, 2007, the Court ruled that this request for post-
conviction relief was being brought under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C, and Utah 
Code Ann., § 78-35a-101, et: sea. Accordingly, the State of Utah would 
be substituted as respondent and all other respondents would be dismissed 
from the case. Petitioner is instructed that, going forward, he is to 
caption this matter properly. 
Having been dismissed as a respondent in the case, this Court then 
reviewed Mr. Fleming's Petition and determined that it did not comply 
with the requirements of Rule 65C(e). Pursuant to Rule 65C(g)(3), the 
Court then granted the petitioner 20 days to resubmit an Amended Petition 
that complied with the rule. Instead of doing so, petitioner then moved 
the Court to waive compliance with the Rule's procedural requirements. 
In his Motion, petitioner seeks to reargue his claims. The requirements 
of Rule 65C(e) are mandatory; therefore, the Court declines petitioner's 
i 
FLEMING V. STATE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
request. Although petitioner's failure to comply with the Court's 
earlier Order should provide sufficient ground for the Court to deny the 
Petition altogether, the Court will grant petitioner one last opportunity 
to bring his Petition into compliance with Rule 65C(e). Should 
petitioner fail to submit a proper Memorandum, the Court will be left 
with no choice but to strike the Petition and dismiss the case. 
Petitioner is hereby given an additional 20 days to file a proper Amended 
Petition and supporting Memorandum. No further extensions or 
opportunities to refile are permitted under the Rule. 
To simplify the matter for petitioner, the Court has reviewed the 
Petition substantively and, as explained below, determined that a number 
of petitioner's claims are frivolous on their face and should be 
dismissed. Therefore, petitioner need not include those claims in his 
Amended Petition. 
The following claims are frivolous and should be deleted from any 
Amended Petition which petitioner may wish to file: 
1 Claim that it was plain error not to give a lesser included 
offense instruction. The decision to demand (or not) a lesser offense 
instruction is a strategic decision of counsel. Since counsel can 
determine whether or not to request such an instruction, its inclusion 
is obviously discretionary. As such, it cannot be plain error for the 
Court not to give such an instruction. 
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2 Claim that including a statutory definition within Jury 
Instruction 16 was intended to inflame passions or confuse the jury is 
frivolous on its face. 
3 Claim that Instruction 9fs direction to ignore lawyer 
statements or that differ from the law given in the instructions somehow 
undermines defense strategies is frivolous on its face. Lawyers' opening 
statements and closing arguments are not evidence and are not a 
substitute for the Court's instructions on the applicable law. 
4 The claim that the original Information, which allegedly 
included an inapplicable theory of liability, somehow prejudiced 
petitioner by "constructively amending the charge" is also frivolous. 
In advance of the Preliminary Hearing, the State filed an Amended 
Information that properly alleged the use of a dangerous weapon instead 
of an auto theft. Petitioner, therefore, had the opportunity to fully 
defend against the applicable charge, which was the one on which he was 
tried. 
5 The claim that counsel failed to raise a Blakely argument is 
also frivolous. Blakely and its progeny apply to states which use a 
determinate sentencing scheme. Utah is an indeterminate sentencing 
state, which is totally unaffected by the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Blakely. 
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6 The claim that the reasonable doubt instruction improperly 
included speculative possibility language or introduced other improper 
descriptors is frivolous on its face. 
7 The claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 
any of the above-referenced frivolous arguments is, itself, frivolous. 
So is the claim that prosecutor's references during the trial to the fact 
that the victim was a BYU student "substantially prejudiced the jury's 
view of the matter." Without any basis in fact, petitioner surmises 
about the religious orientation of the jury members. There is simply no 
basis for arguing "religious discrimination" in this case. 
Based on the Court's determinations as to the above-stated claims, 
petitioner is instructed not to include them in any Amended Petition. 
Pursuant to Rule 65C(g)(1), the Court hereby dismisses those claims. 
The Court finds, however, that the following three claims raised by 
petitioner do not appear to be frivolous on their face: 
1 The claim that the jury instruction on Aggravated Kidnapping 
was erroneous because it added the element of "seizing, confining, 
detaining or transporting...." which only expressly applies to the 
offense of Child Kidnapping. 
2 The claim of error as to instructions which referenced Theft 
and Financial Transaction Card crimes because petitioner was not charged 
with those crimes. 
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3 The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 
correct the above two referenced errors. 
Petitioner is directed to focus his Amended Petition and supporting 
Memorandum on these three claims and to file his amended pleadings in 
full compliance with Rule 65C(e) requirements within 20 days. If 
petitioner does so on a timely basis, the State will be asked to respond. 
The Court hereby dismisses the frivolous claims (1) through (7). 
Finally, the Court notes it has received a request by petitioner for 
appointment of counsel. The Court will consider that request once 
petitioner has complied with the directions provided in this Minute Entry 
and Order. 
So Ordered this^>8*h day of July, 2007 
DISTRICT COURT 
/ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry and Order, to the following, this _day of 
July, 2007: 
Carl S. Fleming #29946 
Uinta 4-501 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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Addendum E 
FILES DISTRICT fcCUHr 
i *i:.rd Judicial Otstncl 
AUG I)», 200? 
SALTLAKflOfiMNTY 
By* 
eputy Clerk 
Attorney Pro Se 
IN THE ^ \ \ ^ \ C ^ DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR^t^L^COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Gx>^\ ^b ^V\< 
vs. 
Petitioner, p 
Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
PETITION KJR^ELIEFUNDER 
THE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES 
ACT 
UCA 78-35a-101.etseq. 
URCP Rule 65C 
Case No.: C r ^ X ^ ^ X V ^ j ) 
JUDGE \ ^ ^ \ < ^ ^ 
^ 
ii. 
2. 
3. 
NAME OF RESPONDENT: 
"^ C, Conviction of Felony: State of Utah 
Conviction of Misdemeanor: County of 
Conviction of Misdemeanor: Municipality of: 
IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT AND RELATED CASES 
1 (a) Name of court that entered the judgment of being challenged: "^y^
 v < ^ *^>v«-c\ C «~v-£~ V 
(b). Location of Court:^^:xXV 
(c). Case Number: 0 ^ \ V ^ ^ v \ - ^ r i \ ^ 
Date of Judgment being c h a l l e n g e d i ^ ^ o ^ ^ D V v v ^ a e k \ 
Sentence: ^ v \ o o ^ ^ ^ V ^ V0V*L_ \ V ^ N ^ X ^ V ^ N O ^ O ^ V -
* A V \ i > a C ) S ^ v > i O ^ \ v ^ \ \ v < t V^Xo^rv CjVxVe. \ V S J 3 * ^ 
^n 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
4. Nature of offense involved (all counts). 
r 
What was your plea? 
J<_Not Guilty 
Guilty 
No Contest 
Guilty and Mentally ill 
_Not Guilty by reason of insanity 
6. If you entered a plea of guilty to some counts, and a not guilty plea to other counts, give 
your plea to each count: 
7. If you pled not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity, was the trial before? 
X Jury Judge 
8. Did you testify at the trial? 
Yes X, No 
9. Did you appeal from the conviction or Sentence? 
X Yes No 
Revised 5/01 
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10. If your answer is "Yes" provide the following information: 
A. Name of Appellate Court: OVcxVv. C c c ^ V c^R ^s>9><2J^o^> 
Case Number: ^ O c A b S I O - CJP\ 
Result: *s~>o*o>\^ 
Date of result or citation of opinion: ' ^ c * ^ N5^ > ^ O O * ^ 
Grounds raised: -X>o^S£ejcX^O CL~ * ? V ^ ^ ^ ^ C X S O L 3 ^ 
Did you seek further review of this appeal? 
>CYes No 
If your answer is "Yes" provide the following information: 
(1) Name of Reviewing Court: " < V x ^ ^ ^ o c t L ^ L C x ^ ^ \ ^ V C ! ^ £ > V \ 
(2) Case Number: ^ n o ^ r A ^ f l - *^C^ 
(3) Result: -*\) CLVS>XOLJ^X 
(4) Date of result or citation of opinion: ^e_^o V^o v dl q 
(5) Grounds raised: ^ s ^ s a ^ e J c A ^ y N ^ C j r ^ N c f ^ o \ 
11. If you did not appeal from your conviction or sentenced, why not? 
12.(a) Other than your direct appeal from your conviction or Sentence, have you filed any 
petitions, applications, or motions with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state of 
federal? 
Yes yC^ No 
Revised 5/01 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(b). If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case Number: 
(3) Result: 
(4) Date of result citation of opinion: 
(5) Grounds Raised: 
c). Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application, or motion? 
Yes X N O 
(d) Did you appeal the decision on your petition, application or motion? 
Yes /yNo 
(e) If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case Number: 
(3) Result: 
(4) Date of result citation of opinion: 
(5) Grounds Raised: 
13(a). Other than the case described in question 12, have you filed any further 
petitions, applications, or motions with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court, state of 
federal? 
-Yes X No 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(b) If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case Number: 
(3) Result: 
(4) Date of result citation of opinion^ 
(5) Grounds Raised: 
c). Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application, or motion? 
Yes X No 
(d) Did you appeal the decision on your petition, application or motion? 
Yes V N o 
(e) If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case Number: 
(3) Result: 
(4) Date of result citation of opinion.^ 
(5) Grounds: 
14. (a) Do you have any petition, appeal, or motion now pending in any court, 
state or federal, relating to the judgment being challenged: 
_Yes V N o 
(b) If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information: 
(1) Name of court: 
(2) Case Number: 
Revised 5/01 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
(3) Nature of Proceeding: 
III. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: You may be barred from presenting additional grounds in a 
future post-conviction petition if you fail to present any grounds that you could present here but 
do not. 
The following is a list of the most frequently raised grounds for relief in Post-Conviction 
proceedings. Each statement preceded by a letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief. 
You should raise in this petition any of these grounds that apply and any other grounds not 
listed that you may have available. 
DO NOT MERELY CHECK THE GROUNDS LISTED. If you believe any of these 
grounds apply to you. You must allege facts. The petition will be returned to you if you merely 
check a ground and fail to list necessary facts or attach supporting documentation. 
(a) Conviction obtained by plea of guilty that was unlawfully induced or not made 
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of 
the plea. 
(b) Conviction obtained by use of coerced confession. 
3) Conviction obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional 
search and seizure. 
(d) Conviction obtained by use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest. 
(e) Conviction obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose 
to the defendant evidence favorable to the defendant. 
Revised 5/01 
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(g) Conviction obtained by a violation of the protection against double jeopardy. 
(h) Conviction obtained by action of a grand of petit jury that was unconstitutionally 
selected and impaneled. 
(I) Denial of effective assistance of counsel. 
(j) Conviction under an unconstitutional statute of constitutionally protected conduct. 
(k) Denial of right to appeal. 
State concisely every ground on which you claim you are entitled to post-conviction relief. 
Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach additional 
pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same. 
(a) GROUND ONE: 9 ^ ^ V ^ C i D O ^ > " ^ o ^ y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ O V i 
Supporting Facts for Ground One (state briefly without citing law or making argument): 
c) GROUND THREE: ^ X ^ ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ C^T Cj30V5Rfc\ 
Supporting Facts for Ground One (state briefly without citing law or making argument): 
Revised 5/01 
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(d) GROUND F O U R f ^ o ^ ^ o o V o ^ v C N - X V W S ^ C J Q v = > & « * X 
Supporting Facts for Ground One (state briefly without citing law or making argument) 
^ O C L v V e c ^ S k c J ^ V ^ O ^ O O O ^ C A S L S ^ V V C X > X - V S S O ^ VAiOQS 
^S\ 
16. If any of the grounds listed above were not previously presented in any other court, 
state or federal, state briefly which grounds were not presented and your reasons for not 
presenting them: ^ c c o v ^ c c f e i o ^ \ ^ J ^ O O s ^ K ^ -*v* c ? b t t L c ? ^ v vC*\ W ^ 
17. Gi\ e the name and address, if known, of each attorney who presented you in the 
following stages of the judgment being challenged: 
(a) Preliminary hearing: 
(b) Arraignment and Plea: 
c) Trial: 
(d) Sentencing: 
(e) Appeal: 
(f) Post-conviction proceeding: 
(g) Appeal from post-conviction proceedings 
18(a) Do you have any future sentence to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the 
judgment being challenged? 
Yes X N o 
Revised 5/01 
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Addendum F 
Erin Riley, # 8375 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, #4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL FLEMING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
Case No. 070901186 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
The respondent, State of Utah, by and through its attorney, Erin Riley, Assistant 
Attorney General, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, hereby moves this Court to dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief because Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or is 
otherwise not entitled to relief on any of the grounds alleged. This motion is supported by 
an accompanying memorandum. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General" 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fi^ day of October, 2007, I served a copy of the 
foregoing STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF by causing the same to be mailed, via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Carl Stanley Fleming, Jr., # 29946 
Utah State Prison 
PO Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
(Petitioner pro se) 
Erin Riley, #8375 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, #4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL FLEMING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 070901186 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
The respondent, State of Utah, by and through its attorney, Erin Riley, Assistant 
Attorney General, submits the following response to the petition for post-conviction relief 
filed by petitioner Carl Fleming. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Fleming was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and one count of aggravated kidnapping, in violation 
A 7 o p 7 1 O DM rJ* j 1 
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of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004), all first degree felonies. R4-5. After a 
preliminary hearing, one count of aggravated robbery was dismissed and Fleming was bound 
over on the remaining counts. R37; Rl 51:40-41. 
The prosecutor submitted several proposed jury instructions before trial, including 
elements and definitions instructions. R65-85. Before jury voir dire, defense counsel told 
the trial court that he had reviewed the State's proposed instructions, found them "to be 
appropriate," and had no "problem with them." R152:5. Consequently, the trial court gave 
all of the prosecutor's proposed instructions as submitted. Compare R65-85 with R95-122. 
The jury convicted Fleming as charged. R124; R165. 
The trial court sentenced Fleming to concurrent prison terms of five years to life for 
aggravated robbery and ten years to life for aggravated kidnapping. Rl 30-32. Fleming filed 
a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. R136. The supreme court transferred 
the appeal to the Utah court of appeals. R147. On September 15,2005, the appellate court 
entered an unpublished memorandum decision which affirmed the conviction. State v. 
Fleming, 2005 UT App. 394 (addendum A). A petition for writ of certiorari was denied on 
February 2,2006. State v. Fleming. 132 P.3d 683 (Utah 2006) (addendum A). 
On January 22, 2007, Fleming filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In August 
an amended petition was filed, and the State was asked to respond to the amended petition. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Stephen Porter was filling his car with gas when petitioner Fleming, a stranger, 
begged him for a ride. Rl52:70, 74-75. Porter reluctantly agreed. Rl52:74-75. Fleming 
thanked him by holding a blade to his throat, threatening to kill him, and stealing his watch, 
CD player, debit card, and PIN number. Rl52:78-80, 84. Fleming then forced Porter to 
accompany him to three different ATM's while Fleming and his friend withdrew as much 
money from Porter's account as his limit would allow. Rl52:84-90. 
"He continued to pester me and pester me and pester me...." 
Porter, a 23-year-old senior at BYU, tried to visit his parents in West Valley City at 
least two or three times a month. Rl52:70,95. At about 9:00 p.m., on Friday, November 7, 
2003, Porter left Provo in his two-door Toyota Tercel for one of those visits. R152:70-72. 
Porter's parents lived near 3500 South. R152:94. Thus, one route to their home from 
Provo was to take the 3300 South exit from 1-15 and travel west. Eventually, 3300 South 
jogs and turns into 3500 South. Id. But that route has several stoplights, so that Porter 
preferred to take 1-15 to Highway 201 (about 2100 South), where he would head west until 
he reached 5600 West. From there Porter would turn south to 3500 South. R152:71, 94, 
1
 The Statement of Facts is taken from the State's brief on appeal (attached as 
addendum B). 
-3-
110. Although longer, Porter's preferred route was "a little faster" because Highway 201 has 
no stoplights and its speed limit is higher than that of 3300 South. Id. 
As Porter neared the Highway 201 junction on November 7, he noticed that he was 
almost out of gas, Rl 52:72. Porter believed that the nearest gas station to the west was on 
Redwood Road. Id. Porter, however, knew of a gas station on 1300 South and State Street 
called Wayne's Comer. Porter's sister used to work across the street from Wayne's Comer 
and Porter had bought gas there before. Id. Thinking that Wayne's Comer was closer than 
Redwood Road, Porter exited 1-15 onto 1300 South and traveled east towards State Street. 
Rl 52:72-73. On the way to Wayne's Comer, Porter passed a 7-Eleven and a Maverick gas 
station. Rl 52:72-73,96. Porter did not stop at either station because a mechanic friend had 
told him that their gas contained an additive that would ruin his engine. R152:72-73. 
At Wayne's Comer, Porter used his debit card to pre-pay for his gas. Rl 52:75. Porter 
did not have any cash on him, nor did he like to carry a lot of cash because it made his 
"wallet a little bulgy." Rl 52:75-76. As Porter pumped gas, Fleming approached him and 
asked for a ride. Rl 52:74. Porter, who had never seen Fleming before, initially "tried to 
blow him off by telling him [that Porter] was meeting some friends." Rl52:70, 75, 98. 
When that "didn't work," Porter told Fleming that one of his friends "was in the hospital, so 
[Porter] needed to go to the hospital." Rl 52:75. But Fleming persisted, saying that he also 
-4-
needed to go to the hospital. Id. As proof, Fleming showed Porter a bruise on his knuckle. 
Id. When Fleming continued "to pester me and pester me and pester me," Porter relented and 
agreed to give him a ride. Id. 
Fleming followed Porter into the gas station store while Porter bought mints with his 
debit card. R152:76. The two then got into Porter'scar and drove off. R152:77. Fleming 
told Porter that he needed to first stop by his parents' home to let them know where he was 
going. Id. Fleming told Porter to go south on State Street. Rl52:77-78. Fleming asked if 
he could smoke in Porter's car. Rl52:88. Porter, a non-smoker, said "no" because he did 
not like the smell of cigarette smoke and did not want it in his car.2 Id. Fleming then asked 
Porter if he "ever did drugs." Rl 52:89. When Porter said "no," Fleming refused to believe 
him. Id. Fleming confided that he was at that moment on methamphetamine. Id. 
"Give me all your money or I will kill you." 
Fleming ultimately directed Porter to a house on a dead-end street behind the 
Franklin-Covey baseball field. Rl 52:78. Fleming asked Porter "to kill the engine because 
he didn't want to wake his parents up." Id. When Porter obeyed, Fleming reached into his 
2
 Fleming made much of Porter's testimony that Fleming had asked permission to 
smoke in his car, calling it "peculiarly polite behavior coming from a purported 
aggravated kidnapper and robber." Br. Aplt. 5, 19, 29. In fact, there was nothing peculiar 
about this behavior because at this point Fleming had not yet robbed and kidnapped 
Porter. Rather, as seen below, Fleming was waiting until he could lull Porter into a 
secluded area where he could safely rob him. 
-5-
coat pocket and pulled out "a blade of some sort." Id. Holding the blade in his right hand, 
Fleming reached across Porter and held it against the left side of Porter's neck. Rl 52:98. 
Porter could not see the blade, but he "sure felt it." Id. Porter thought it felt like a "razor or 
a box-cutting knife." R152:99-100. 
Fleming told Porter to "[g]ive me all your money or I will kill you." Rl 52:79. Porter 
gave Fleming his wallet. Although the wallet contained no money, it held Porter's debit card. 
Id. Fleming took the card, looked at it, and asked what he could do with it. Id. Porter 
explained that Fleming "could buy whatever he wanted with it." Id. Unsatisfied, Fleming 
demanded something else. Id. Terrified, Porter handed Fleming his watch, his CD player, 
and a book of CD's. Rl52:80. Each time Porter handed Fleming an item, Fleming 
threatened "there better be something else, or else." Id. 
After taking all of Porter' s belongings, Fleming put the blade away, but ordered Porter 
to drive to a friend's house, a few blocks south. Rl 52:80-81. Fleming told Porter that if he 
"tried to escape or tried to run away he would kill [him]." Rl 52:80. When they reached the 
friend's home, Fleming ordered Porter out of the car and they both walked to the door. 
Rl 52:81. Fleming warned Porter "once again that if [he] ran or anything [he] had a gun and 
. . . would kill" him. Id. 
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Fleming's friend was not at home. R152:81-82. As the two walked back to the car, 
Fleming took Porter's car keys. Rl 52:82. Fleming got into the driver's seat while Porter got 
into the front passenger's seat. Id. Porter did not try to escape because he "felt [his] life was 
in danger." Id. Fleming had "told [Porter] he had a gun, and there was nothing to dispute 
that." Id. And Porter had seen "the look in [Fleming's] eyes when he held the blade against 
[Porter's] throat." Porter was convinced that Fleming "would not have hesitated to use it." 
Id. 
"Ifelt that if I didn 7 cooperate with him fully, I would be dead." 
Fleming then drove to an apartment complex across the street from Wayne's Comer. 
Rl 52:83. Fleming pulled into the parking lot, "stuck his head out the window and called for 
another friend of his." Id. A woman, Sharon Thomas, yelled back and came downstairs. 
Rl52:83, 114-15. Fleming had Porter get into the back seat, while Thomas took his place 
in the front. R152:83. 
Although Porter could have run at this point, he "felt like he had no place to run." 
R152:84. Porter believed Fleming "still had a gun" and that if Porter "tried to move 
[Fleming] would kill [him]." Id. Porter did not "feel safe going back to Wayne's Comer, 
because that's where [he] first met [Fleming]." Id. Also, by then it was around 10:00 p.m. 
and all the nearby businesses "looked closed." Id. 
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Once Thomas was in the car, Fleming held up Porter's card and announced he had a 
credit card. R152:l 16. Fleming wanted Thomas to use it to buy him cigarettes "or charge 
something.'5 Id. When Thomas pointed out that the card was "a cash card," Fleming told her 
that it belonged to Porter. Rl 52:117. Thomas asked, "If it is his card, why didn't he use it?" 
Fleming replied, "I don't want him to." 
Thomas asked Porter if the card was his. Rl 52:117. When Porter said "yes," Thomas 
asked, "Well, are you giving me permission to use it?" Id. Porter replied, "Yes." Rl 52:117, 
126. Thomas then asked for his PIN number. R152:117. Porter gave it to her because he 
"didn't feel like [he] had a choice." R152:85. Porter "felt that if [he] didn't cooperate with 
[Fleming] fully, [Porter] would be dead." Id. 
Fleming drives Porter to three different ATMfs 
Fleming drove Porter and Thomas to a 7-Eleven on about 500 East and 1300 South. 
Rl 52:85. Thomas went in to use the ATM while Fleming and Porter waited in the car. Id. 
Fleming threatened that if Porter made "eye contact with anybody or if [Porter did] anything 
stupid, that [Fleming] would kill [Porter]." Id. Porter promised to "be cool." Id. Butafier 
waiting about five minutes for Thomas, Fleming began "getting nervous." Rl52:85-86. 
Noticing this, Porter suggested that they go inside. Rl52:86. Porter hoped that he could 
"make eye contact or signal someone." Id. Fleming agreed, but before the two went inside 
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he "reminded [Porter] that he had the gun, and he told [Porter] that if [he] tried anything 
stupid, he would kill [him]." Id. 
Fleming entered the 7-Eleven first, with Porter closely following him. R152:105, 
143-44. Porter tried to catch someone's eye, but "[n]o one would look at [him]." R152:87. 
Thomas joined them and the three left the store, with Thomas leaving first, then Fleming, and 
lastly Porter. Id. They all got back into the car in the same positions as before. Id. Thomas 
had made two $60.00 withdrawals from the ATM. Defense Exhibits 1, 2, 3. 
Fleming then drove to a drive-through ATM at a Wells Fargo Bank on 300 South. 
R152:89, 121; Defense Ex. 4. Thomas asked Porter for his PIN number again because she 
"kept forgetting it." R152:117. Thomas then got out of the passenger door and walked 
around to the ATM where she withdrew $200.00 from Porter's account. Rl 52:118; Defense 
Ex.4. 
When Thomas returned to the car, she and Fleming "seemed a little confused." 
Rl 52:89. Neither of them knew where another 7-Eleven or gas station was, "so [they] drove 
around a little bit and eventually stumbled" onto a 7-Eleven at 1300 East and 200 South. Id; 
Defense Ex. 5,6,7. Thomas again went in alone while Fleming and Porter waited in the car. 
Rl52:89-90. Thomas withdrew another $200.00. Defense Ex. 5. Thomas returned to the 
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car. Rl 52:90. Angry that Thomas had not withdrawn more money, Fleming sent her back 
into the store to get more. Id. 
Thomas tried to withdraw an additional $400.00, but that request was denied because 
Porter's limit of $500.00 had been reached. R152:90; Defense Ex. 6. Thomas then tried to 
withdraw another $100.00, but that request was also denied. Defense Ex. 7. 
When Thomas returned to the car, she told Fleming that the ATM would not let her 
withdraw any more money. Rl 52: 119. She and Fleming then divided the money between 
them. Rl 52:90-91. Thomas asked Porter if he was "OK." R152:120. Before Porter could 
answer, Fleming told him, "Don't fucking talk to her " Id. Angry, Thomas told Porter, 
"Let me the hell out." Id. Fleming dropped Thomas off at about South Temple and 700 East. 
Rl 52:120-21. Porter moved up to the front passenger seat. Rl 52:91. 
Fleming then drove Porter along North Temple to the State Fairgrounds. Id. On the 
way, Porter saw a police car on their right side. Id. Porter noted that the officer "watched 
[him] very closely when they passed him." Id. Fleming warned Porter "especially if I tried 
to get their attention he would kill me." Id. 
Fleming stopped the car on a side street near the fairgrounds where he "pause[d] a 
little bit" and "wipe[d] his fingerprints off the steering wheel." Rl 52:92. Fleming then told 
Porter that if he told "anyone what happened, he would kill [Porter]." Id. 
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Porter drove directly to his parents' home because his "feeling of security had just 
been completely ripped from [him]. [He] felt vulnerable, [he] felt weak, [he] felt alone." 
Rl52:93. Porter did not drive to a police station because he did not know where one was. 
Rl 52:92. He also did not stop to call police from a pay phone because he had no money. Id. 
After Porter returned home, he discovered a small clear, plastic tube or vial wedged 
in the driver's seat, between the back and the seat. R152:101, 108-09. Porter recalled that 
during the robbery and kidnapping, Fleming had handed this vial to Porter to hold. 
R152:101. Fleming told Porter that the tube contained methamphetamine. Id. Porter had 
tried to hold the vial on the edges so that he would not get his fingerprints on it. R152:110. 
Porter had hoped that doing so would also preserve Fleming's fingerprints. Id. 
Porter's parents arrived home soon after he got there. Rl 52:93. After they talked and 
hugged, Porter called the police and reported the robbery and kidnapping. Id. At that time, 
Porter told police about the vial he found in his car. R152:108. At the officer's request, 
Porter later took the vial to the police station. Rl52:108-09. The police, however, did not 
test the contents of the vial, nor did they check it for fingerprints, because they saw no 
evidentiary value in doing so. R152:145. 
The defense 
In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted that Porter was not robbed, but was 
only getting even for a fraudulent drug deal. Rl 52:64-68. Counsel explained that Fleming 
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was a drug dealer who offered to sell Porter some methamphetamine. Rl 52:64-65. Counsel 
claimed that since Porter did not have any cash, he, Fleming, and Thomas went to several 
different locations where they withdrew cash in order to pay for the drugs. Rl52:65-67. 
Defense counsel claimed that Porter waited to call police until after he got home because it 
was only then that he discovered that Fleming had sold him rock salt instead of 
methamphetamine. Rl52:67. Defense counsel also asserted in opening that Porter never 
described a knife or blade of any sort to police. Id. Defense counsel explained that when 
Fleming was apprehended over two months later, police found "a little tool in his pocket" 
that included "a small knife blade." Id. Counsel suggested that when police described this 
"little fold-out tool" to Porter, he adopted that description as the blade that Fleming held to 
his neck. R152:67-68. 
To support his theory of the case, defense counsel elicited from Porter on cross-
examination that Porter had taken a longer route to his home and passed several gas stations 
before reaching Wayne's Comer. Rl52:94-97. Defense counsel elicited from Thomas on 
cross-examination that she had never seen Fleming display a knife or gun and that she never 
heard Fleming threaten Porter. Rl52:125-26. Counsel also elicited from Thomas, a drug 
addict, that she knew that drug deals were regularly conducted at Wayne's Comer. 
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Rl 52:123. Thomas also testified on cross that although she did not know if Fleming was an 
"actual drug dealer," she had seen him sell drugs to people in the past. Id. 
In addition to building his case on cross-examination, defense counsel called 
Detective Todd Mitchell. R152:131,149. Detective Mitchell testified on direct that Porter 
described the blade that Fleming had used "as a metallic-colored, switchblade-shaped 
object." R152:134. When Fleming was arrested, about two-and-one-half months after the 
robbery, Fleming had on him a small "tool or knife, gadget." Rl52:132-33. Detective 
Mitchell believed that this small "tool" was "close" to the blade that Porter had described to 
him. Rl 52:134-35. A photo of the small tool found on Fleming—Defense Exhibit 9—was 
received into evidence over the State's relevance objection. R152:135. 
The State argued that the small tool was irrelevant because it had been seized two and 
a half months after the incident. R152:133, 135. Defense counsel contended that it was 
relevant because it contradicted Porter's testimony that he had never seen a knife and showed 
that Porter had simply adopted the detective's description of a blade found on Fleming. 
R152:135. Defense counsel explained that he was "not suggesting that [the tool] was 
actually used. But it goes to impeachment of statement of witnesses in the case." Id. Based 
on that explanation, the trial court received Defense Exhibit No. 9 into evidence. Id. 
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Detective Mitchell also testified on direct that he had obtained bank records showing 
the withdrawals from Porter's bank account that night. R152:135-36. See Defense Exhibits 
1-7. None of those records showed Porter's claimed purchase of gas and mints at Wayne's 
Corner. R152:139. When questioned about this, Detective Mitchell said that he must have 
only requested the records for the ATM withdrawals, although he did not specifically recall 
doing so. R152:139-40. 
After Fleming's closing argument, but before the State's rebuttal, the trial court 
rescinded its earlier admission of the photo of the "small tool" found on Fleming. Rl 52:162. 
The trial judge explained to the jury that she was sustaining the State's earlier relevance 
objection because "there is no evidence, credible or otherwise, presented, establishing that 
the item depicted in Defense Exhibit 9 was the item that was used, that was, in fact, even 
present on the date in question, which is November 7." Id. The court continued, "This item 
was found on the person of the Fleming at the time that he was, I assume, arrested, taken into 
custody in connection with the charges, well over two months later." Id. Defense counsel 
then stated that he assumed that the court, by its statement, was "not making any conclusion 
whether any item, in fact, was used." Id. The trial court agreed, explaining that "there is no 
evidence that this item was anywhere near the events and acts in question on the day we are 
talking about." Id. 
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•M 
ALLEGATIONS RAISED 
On appeal, Fleming asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based 
on trial counsel's failure to object to jury instructions, failure to move to merge the charges, 
and mishandling of the trial itself. State v. Fleming. 2005 UT App 394 (addendum A). 
In his current state petition for post-conviction relief, Fleming asserts that: 
1. The jury instructions were erroneous, 
2. He received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object to 
or correct erroneous jury instructions, and 
3. Prosecutorial misconduct 
All of these claims either were already raised or could have been raised on appeal. 
As to any claim that was not previously raised on appeal, Fleming states that his attorney was 
ineffective and wouldn't raise them. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FLEMING IS NOT ENTITLED TO POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ON 
CLAIMS THAT WERE ALREADY RAISED ON APPEAL. 
Petitioner Fleming has already had a full appeal before the Utah Supreme Court. State 
v. Fleming. 2005 UT App. 394, unpub. memo, decision, cert, denied, 132 P.3d 683 (Utah 
2006) (addendum A). In his current petition, Fleming alleges that certain jury instructions 
were erroneous, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed 
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to object to or conect erroneous jury instructions. Fleming is not entitled to raise these issues 
in a petition for post-conviction relief because they have already been raised and addressed 
on appeal. 
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, a petitioner is not entitled to relief on any 
ground that was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) 
& (c). On appeal, Fleming alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because 
his counsel failed to object to erroneous jury instructions. The Utah Court of Appeals ruled 
on this issue and stated that "the premise of Fleming's argument, that the jury instructions 
provided the jury with an opportunity to convict on theories not charged, is incorrect." 
Fleming, 2005 UT App 394. The court went on to hold that "[b]ecause the elements 
instruction clearly stated only one option for the jury to find Fleming guilty, there was no 
error by trial counsel in failing to object to the instructions." Id. 
Fleming is therefore not entitled to post-conviction relief as to his claims that jury 
instructions were erroneous, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because 
counsel failed to object to or correct the jury instructions, because these issues have already 
been raised, addressed and denied on appeal. 
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II. FLEMING IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF AS TO HIS CLAIM OF 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT BECAUSE THIS CLAIM COULD HAVE 
BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AND FLEMING HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 
RAISE IT. 
In a petition for post-conviction relief, a person is not eligible for relief upon any 
ground that was already "raised or addressed at trial or on appeal" or that "could have been 
but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106. However, "a 
person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was not 
raised at trial or on appeal if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel." Id. 
Fleming's claim of prosecutorial misconduct could have been raised on appeal. 
Therefore, Fleming would only be entitled to post-conviction relief if he could establish that 
his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this claim on appeal. 
"The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as 
the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 
1153,1157 (Utah 1996). To prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Fleming must 
show that his appellate attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
(1984). 
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To meet the prejudice requirement, Fleming would have to demonstrate that there is 
a reasonable probability that but for appellate counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In other words, that the outcome of 
his appeal would have been different - that his conviction or sentence would have been 
reversed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746) (2000) (must show a 
reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on his appeal); and see Carter v. 
Galetka, 2001 UT 96, U 47-48, 44 P.3d 626. 
The courts have defined a reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the reliability of the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 
S.Ct. at 2068. "The error must be such that we lose confidence in the result on appeal." 
Butterfieldv. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App), cert denied 826 ?.2d 65 \ (Utah 1991). 
To be entitled to post-conviction relief, Fleming must establish that his appellate 
counsel's performance was deficient. Even if this court should find that appellate counsel's 
performance was deficient, Fleming must also establish that he suffered prejudice from his 
appellate counsel's deficient performance. Fleming must establish that if his counsel had 
raised this issue on appeal, there is a reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence 
would have been reversed. 
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It is not enough to simply allege that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue. 
Appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise an issue without merit. 
When a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise an issue on appeal, we examine the merits of the omitted issue. Failure 
to raise an issue that is without merit "does not constitute constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel" because the Sixth Amendment does not 
require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal. 
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,138, 44 P.3d 626, 639 (citing Banks v. Reynolds. 54 F.3d 
1508,1515 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
The fact that a claim was not raised on appeal does not necessarily make appellate 
counsel's performance deficient. "[T]he United States Supreme Court has noted that counsel 
does not have to advance every argument regardless of merit on appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 394, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)." Butterfieldv. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 
336 (Utah App. 1991). 
The fact that a claim was not raised on appeal does not, by itself, establish prejudice. 
A reviewing court must determine "if counsel's failure was sufficiently prejudicial to 
undermine []confidence in the result on appeal." Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 337. In other 
words, in order to establish prejudice, Fleming must show that if appellate counsel had raised 
on appeal his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, his conviction likely would have been 
overturned on appeal. The issue therefore rests on the underlying merits of the claims of 
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prosecutorial misconduct. Fleming would only be entitled to relief if he could establish that 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert on appeal a prosecutorial misconduct 
claim that probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Fleming has failed to meet 
this standard. 
In his current petition, Fleming alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
because he used the elements of child kidnapping to prosecute him for aggravated 
kidnapping, thus making mis-statements of fact and law (amended pet. at 8). Fleming also 
alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making references to Fleming's prior 
bad acts and incorporating fictitious charges such as theft and financial card transactions. 
Id. Fleming also alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making unnecessary 
references to the victim being a BYU student. Id. 
Fleming is not entitled to post-conviction relief, because his claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct have no merit. Even if the claims had been raised on appeal, they most likely 
would not have succeeded. Therefore, appellate counsel cannot be found ineffective for 
failing to raise these claims on appeal. 
A. Fleming has failed to establish that any prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred 
To demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, Fleming must show that counsel's conduct 
"call[ed] to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
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determining its verdict." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 42, 57 P.3d 1139 (citations 
and quotation marks omitted). He must then show 'that the effect of [the prosecutor's 
conduct] was 'substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in 
[its] absence, there would have been a more favorable result.'" State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 
219, K 10, 138 P.3d 90 (quoting State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Utah App. 1995)). 
In addition, "'if proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark 
will not be presumed prejudicial.'" State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, ^  45,20 P.3d 271 (citation 
omitted); see also State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, If 35, 58 P.3d 879 (holding that error 
in admitting evidence was harmless where other evidence supporting conviction was 
substantial). 
Even assuming that appellate counsel performed deficiently by not raising on appeal 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct, Fleming's claims nonetheless fail because he cannot 
show "that the effect of [any prosecutor error] was' substantial and prejudicial such that there 
is a reasonable likelihood that, in [its] absence, there would have been a more favorable 
result.'" Devey, 2006 UT App 219, % 10 (quoting Wright, 893 P.2d at 1118). 
1. Fleming has failed to establish that the prosecutor used the 
elements of child kidnapping to prosecute him for aggravated 
kidnapping 
Fleming argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct because he used the 
elements of child kidnapping to prosecute him for aggravated kidnapping. Respondent is not 
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sure exactly what Fleming means by this assertion. However, it appears that he is objecting 
to certain language used in the information and jury instructions. The language used 
occurred in a prior version of the aggravated kidnapping statute. Therefore, Fleming's claim 
is more properly a challenge to jury instructions, rather than prosecutorial misconduct. 
Fleming was charged with one count of aggravated kidnapping, in violation of §76-5-
302 Utah Code Aim. (R40). Section 76-5-302 is the correct statutory reference for the crime 
of aggravated kidnapping. The crime of aggravated kidnapping is committed if certain things 
occur in the course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping. § 76-5-302. The crime 
of kidnapping is found at § 76-5-301. Kidnapping occurs when someone is detained, 
restrained, or held against their will. Jury instruction no. 20 advised the jury of the elements 
of aggravated kidnapping (Rl 17, addendum C). Jury Instruction no. 24 advised the jury as 
to what they had to find in order to find Fleming guilty of the crime of aggravated kidnapping 
(R121, addendum D). 
The Information alleged that "Fleming, a party to the offense, did intentionally or 
knowingly, and without authority of law, and against the will of Stephen Porter, by any 
means and in any manner did seize, confine, detain or transport the victim, with the intent to 
facilitate the commission or attempted commission of a felony, or flight from a felony." 
(R40). Jury instructions 20 and 24 also used the words "seize, confine, detain or transport" 
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(Rl 17 & 121). A former version of the aggravated kidnapping statute used the words seize, 
confine, detain or transport (addendum E). That same language is still used in the child 
kidnapping statute at §76-5-301.1. However, the kidnapping statute now uses only the words 
"detains" or "restrains." 
On appeal, the State's brief pointed out that Fleming had not challenged the technical 
correctness of either Jury Instruction No. 20 or Instruction No. 24 (addendum B, p. 18, 
footnote 3). It noted, however, that both instructions used language from a prior version of 
the aggravated kidnapping statute. Before 2001, a person committed aggravated kidnapping 
if he "by any means and in any manner, seizefd], confine[d], detain[ed], or transported] the 
victim" with one of the specified intents, including the intent to facilitate the commission of 
a felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) (addendum E).3 
3
 The former statute did not require that any detention last for a certain period of 
time. Effective April 30, 2001, the aggravated kidnapping statute was amended to 
provide that one commits aggravated kidnapping if he, "in the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnapping," acts with one of the specified statutory intents, 
including the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
302 (West 2004); 2001 Utah Laws ch. 301, § 4. A person commits unlawful detention if 
he "detains or restrains the victim under circumstances not constituting a violation of 
[kidnapping, child kidnapping, or aggravated kidnapping]." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 
(West 2004). A person commits kidnapping, inter alia, if he "detains or restrains the 
victim for any substantial period of time." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(1) (West 2004). 
Although simple kidnapping requires the detention to last for a substantial period 
time, unlawful detention does not have any time element. Thus, the current aggravated 
kidnapping statute does not require detention for any set period of time. 
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Even though the jury instructions used the former statutory language, the jury was 
correctly instructed as to the elements it needed to find under the current statute. The jury 
was never instructed as to the elements of child kidnapping. Moreover, defense counsel 
affirmatively approved the instructions as given. 
On appeal, Fleming did not claim that either Instruction No. 20 or Instruction No. 24 
was incorrect for using the prior statutory language, nor did he claim that this created any 
confusion with the jury, or that it constituted prosecutorial misconduct. However, Fleming 
could have raised this issue on appeal. Therefore, the only way he would be entitled to post-
conviction relief is if he could establish that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
raising this issue on appeal. 
a. Invited error 
Fleming cannot establish that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this 
issue on appeal because any error was invited. Fleming's trial counsel did not object to the 
jury instructions at trial. The state submitted jury instructions. Fleming's counsel said: "And 
I have looked at the State's instructions, and I find them to be appropriate. I don't have any 
problem with them. I don't have any particular instructions that I intend to offer." (R152:5). 
Because counsel did not object at trial, and affirmatively asserted that he found the State's 
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proposed instructions "to be appropriate," appellate counsel would not have been able to 
simply raise this issue directly on appeal. 
When a defendant does not object to a jury instruction at trial, appellate courts may 
sometimes "review it under the manifest injustice or plain error standard." State v. Powell, 
2007 UT 9, Tf 11,154 P.3d 788 "[J]ury instructions to which a party failed to object will not 
be reviewed absent manifest injustice." State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287,1290 (Utah App 
1994). However, this claim could not have been raised for plain error or manifest injustice, 
because it was invited error. 
Appellate review under plain error is not available when, as here, defendant himself 
invites the alleged error. Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
"[u]nless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction 
may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." A claim of manifest 
injustice under rule 19(e) is generally reviewed under "the same standard that is applied to 
determine whether plain error exists . . . ." State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 
1998). See also State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, If 40, 82 P.3d 1106. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently held that a defendant may not obtain plain error or manifest 
injustice review of an alleged instructional error when "counsel, either by statement or act 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction." 
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State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 P.3d 111. Accord State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 
62,520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (defendant could not obtain appellate review of alleged erroneous 
jury instruction because he stipulated to the instruction); State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 
Tf 9, 86 P.3d 742 (denying appellate review of jury instruction offered by defendant); State 
v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996) (defendant invited error when he failed 
to object to instruction when specifically queried by the court); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 
1021,1023 (Utah 1987) (defendant invited error when his counsel actively represented to the 
trial court that she had read instruction and had no objection to it). 
Fleming's counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objection 
to the challenged instruction when he stated that he had read the prosecutor's proposed 
instructions and that he believed they were all "appropriate." R152:5. Because Fleming 
invited any error, he is not entitled to plain error review. See Pinder, 2005 UT 15, *[[ 61 ("we 
have consistently declined to review allegations of jury instruction error, even under the 
manifest injustice standard, when the error complained of was invited"). 
Nor could Fleming have obtained appellate review under the exceptional 
circumstances doctrine. This exception to the preservation rule is "'ill-defined and applies 
primarily to rare procedural anomalies.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 12, 10 P.3d 346 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209, n.3 (Utah 1993)). The exceptional 
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circumstances doctrine has been applied "sparingly" and has been reserved "for the most 
unusual circumstances where [the] failure to consider an issue that was not properly 
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 
2004 UT 29, f 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
A finding of exceptional circumstances "requires something much more exceptional 
than mere oversight by trial counsel " State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996) 
(citing State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332,333 & n.l (Utah 1993)). This is because such facts give 
rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, another well-recognized exception 
to the preservation rule. Id. If the exceptional circumstances concept applied in such cases, 
"we would have to employ it in every case where there might have been ineffective 
assistance at trial which is not raised on appeal." Id. This would sanction "use of the 
exceptional circumstances concept as a way to address problems caused by ineffective 
assistance of counsel, but without requiring appellant to prove up such a claim on appeal in 
accordance with his or her burden under the Sixth Amendment, as elucidated in Strickland 
v. Washington and its progeny." Id. (citations omitted). 
Moreover, to hold otherwise would foster "invited error." See State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, If 31, 12 P.3d 92 (refusing "to give defendants the benefit of traditional plain 
error analysis where doing so would create an incentive for invited error"); State v. Brown, 
-27-
948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (refusing to review a claim where trial counsel consciously 
chose not to object because to do otherwise "would be sanctioning a procedure that fosters 
invited error"). 
"A defendant may not obtain plain error review of an alleged instructional error when 
'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had 
no objection to the jury instruction.'" State v. Cox, 2007 UT App 317, \\% P.3d , 
citing State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54,70 P.3d 111. Because Fleming invited the error, 
he would not have been entitled to plain error review even if this claim had been raised on 
appeal. Utah appellate courts "have consistently declined to review allegations of jury 
instruction error, even under the manifest injustice standard, when the error complained of 
was invited." State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, Tf 61, 114 P.3d 551. 
b. Harmless error 
Even if the jury instructions could have been reviewed on appeal for plain error or 
manifest injustice, Fleming still would not have been entitled to appellate relief because any 
error was harmless. Under the plain error standard, an appellate court may reverse when a 
party can show that: 1) an error exists, 2) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court, and 3) the error is harmful. State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, f 18, 154 P.3d 788. Fleming 
cannot meet this standard. 
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Any error in the jury instructions, by using the words seize, confine, detain and 
transport instead of using only the words detain or restrain, was harmless. "[HJarmless error 
is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it 
affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22,120, 20 P.3d 888. 
Even if an appellate court finds a jury instruction error, it "will reverse only if the defendant 
shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case." State v. Tinoco, 
860 P.2d 988, 989 (Utah App 1993). 
Showing that the error was harmful requires "more than the mere possibility that the 
outcome might have been different without the error, but a showing that, 'absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, f 21, 
154 P.3d 788 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
In Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, (1993), the 
words are defined as follows: 
Seize - "3a: to possess or take by force . . . b: to take prisoner: ARREST" 
Confine - "a: to keep in narrow quarters: IMPRISON, b: to prevent free 
outward passage or motion of: SECURE, ENCLOSE, FASTEN" 
Transport - "la: to transfer or convey from one person or place to another" 
Detain - " 1 : to hold or keep in or as if in custody . . . 3: to restrain esp. from 
proceeding: hold back: STOP, DELAY" 
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Restrain - "la: to hold (as a person) back from some action, procedure, or 
course: prevent from doing something... b: to limit or restrict to or in respect 
to a particular action or course; keep within bounds or under control... 4a: to 
deprive of liberty: place under arrest or restraint." 
The fact that the words "seize, confine, detain or transport" were used instead of the 
words detain and restrain, is irrelevant because the meaning of the words is similar. In 
addition, the words are merely used to help a jury understand what constitutes kidnapping, 
when, in fact, most reasonable jurors would understand what constitutes kidnapping without 
any additional wording. The fact that the words "seize, confine, detain or transport" were 
used does not undermine confidence in the verdict. Fleming cannot establish that but for this 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome of his trial. 
Fleming is not entitled to post-conviction relief because his claim that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct because he used the elements of child kidnapping to prosecute him 
for aggravated kidnapping, is not meritorious. First, the prosecutor did not use any elements 
of child kidnapping to prosecute him. The language of the information and jury instructions 
simply used words from a prior version of the aggravated kidnapping statute instead of the 
current, new language. Second, Fleming has failed to establish that if this claim had been 
raised on appeal, there is a reasonable probability that his conviction would have been 
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reversed. Therefore, he cannot establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not 
raising this claim on appeal, and he is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
2. Fleming has failed to establish that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by making references to Flemings prior bad acts. 
Fleming alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making references to 
his prior bad acts. However, Fleming does not state when this occurred, and respondent 
could not find anywhere in the record that the prosecutor made reference to any of Fleming's 
prior bad acts or convictions. 
In fact, Fleming's trial counsel filed a motion in limine asking the court to prohibit 
introduction of evidence or testimony concerning any prior convictions of crimes of violence 
by Fleming (R53-59). Prior to the start of trial, the court addressed this issue, and said: "I 
understand the parties have resolved those issues." (Rl 52:4). The prosecutor responded by 
saying that "the State has no intention of introducing any prior convictions of the defendant." 
(R152:4). And the prosecutor did not introduce any of Fleming's prior convictions. 
Fleming is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this issue because it lacks merit. 
He has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Therefore appellate 
counsel could not be ineffective for not raising this claim on appeal. 
-31-
3. Fleming has failed to establish that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by incorporating fictitious charges such as theft and 
financial card transactions 
Fleming alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct by incorporating fictitious 
charges such as theft and financial card transactions. Fleming does not elaborate on this 
claim, and it is unclear what he means. Respondent cannot find anywhere in the record that 
the prosecutor improperly incorporated charges of theft or financial card transactions. 
In the original information, Fleming was charged with two counts of aggravated 
robbery and one count of aggravated kidnapping (R4-5). Count one was eventually 
dismissed and an amended information charged Fleming with one count of aggravated 
robbery and one count of aggravated kidnapping (R39-40). A jury convicted Fleming of one 
count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated kidnapping (R124). 
The jury was correctly advised as to the crime of aggravated robbery and the elements 
that must be proved to establish that aggravated robbery occurred (Jury Instructions 16 & 17, 
R113 & 114). The jury was also instructed that one of the elements of aggravated 
kidnapping included that the kidnapping was "committed with the intent to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of 
a felony." (Jury Instruction 24, R121, copy attached as addendum D). 
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The jury instructions also correctly advised the jury of several acts that constituted 
felonies. Jury instruction no. 22 advised the jury: "You are instructed that the use of a 
financial transaction card without the consent of the owner, with the intent to obtain money 
or property in excess of $1000 is a felony." (R119). Instruction no. 23 advised the jury: 
"You are instructed that theft of over $ 1000 is a felony." (R120). Instruction no. 25 advised 
the jury: "You are instructed that Robbery is a felony." (R122). 
The jury instructions were appropriate, and Fleming did not object to any of the 
instructions at the time of trial (R152:5). No prosecutorial misconduct occurred in relation 
to these instructions. Because there was no prosecutorial misconduct, appellate counsel 
could not have been ineffective for failing to raise this claim on appeal. 
4. Fleming has failed to establish that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by making reference to the fact that the victim was a BYU 
student 
As far as respondent could discern from a review of the trial transcript, the fact that 
the victim was a student at BYU was only mentioned twice. The first time was when the 
victim was testifying. When asked where he went to school, he said: "Brigham Young 
University." (R152:70). The second time it was mentioned was in the prosecutor's closing 
argument. In closing, the prosecutor summarized some of the evidence, stating: "We know 
why Stephen Porter is at Wayne's Comer. The kid's coming home from school at BYU, on 
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his way to West Valley, taking the shortest way home, with no stoplights out 201, starting 
to run out of gas . . . " (R152:150). 
In stating that the victim was coming home from school at B YU, the prosecutor was 
merely stating an accurate fact. It was not prosecutorial misconduct to mention this fact. 
Fleming's claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by mentioning that the victim 
attended BYU is not meritorious. Therefore appellate counsel could not have been 
ineffective for not raising it on appeal, and Fleming is not entitled to post-conviction relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts and argument set forth above, respondent respectfully requests that 
this Court DENY and DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE the petition for post-conviction relief 
filed by petitioner Fleming. 
Dated this \% day of October, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
.34. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the jS day of October, 2007, I served a copy of the 
foregoing STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF by causing the same to be mailed, via first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Carl Stanley Fleming, Jr., # 29946 
Utah State Prison 
PO Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
(petitioner pro se) 
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Addendum G 
Erin Riley, #8375 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L.Shurtleff, #4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL FLEMING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 070901186 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
„_, , „: 
On January 22,2007, petitioner Carl Fleming filed a state petition for post-conviction 
relief. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner Fleming filed a reply to the 
State's motion. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on February 27, 2008. 
Petitioner appeared pro se. Assistant attorney general Erin Riley appeared as counsel for the 
respondent, State of Utah. Following the hearing, the Court entered an oral ruling, granting 
the State's motion to dismiss. 
N U 1 DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy Clerk 
Now being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and enters the following order which grant's the State's motion and 
dismisses with prejudice the petition for post-conviction relief filed by petitioner Carl 
Fleming. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Fleming was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann, § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and one count of aggravated kidnapping, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004), all first degree felonies. R4-5. 
2. After a preliminary hearing, one count of aggravated robbery was dismissed and 
Fleming was bound over on the remaining counts. R37; Rl 51:40-41. 
3. The prosecutor submitted several proposed jury instructions before trial, including 
elements and definitions instructions. R65-85. 
4. Before jury voir dire, defense counsel told the trial court that he had reviewed the 
State's proposed instructions, found them "to be appropriate," and had no "problem with 
them."R152:5. 
5. The trial court gave all of the prosecutor's proposed instructions as submitted. 
Compare R65-85 with R95-122. 
6. The jury convicted Fleming as charged. R124; R165. 
-2-
Ai^w 
7. The trial court sentenced Fleming to concurrent prison terms of five years to life for 
aggravated robbery and ten years to life for aggravated kidnapping. R130-32. 
8. Fleming filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. R136. The 
supreme court transferred the appeal to the Utah court of appeals. R147. 
9. On September 15, 2005, the appellate court entered an unpublished memorandum 
decision which affirmed the conviction. State v. Fleming, 2005 UT App. 3 94. A petition for 
writ of certiorari was denied on February 2, 2006. State v. Fleming, 132 P.3d 683 (Utah 
2006). 
10. On January 22, 2007, Fleming filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In August 
an amended petition was filed, and the State was asked to respond. 
11. In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss. 
12. A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held on February 27,2008. 
13. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Fleming asserted: 
• that the jury instructions were erroneous because they added the elements of 
seizing, confining, detaining or transporting, which he claimed only applies to the 
offense of child kidnapping; 
• that the jury instructions were erroneous because they referenced theft and 
financial transaction card crimes; 
• that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to object 
to or correct erroneous jury instructions; and 
• that the prosecutor committed misconduct because he used the elements of child 
kidnapping to prosecute him for aggravated kidnapping. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In a petition for post-conviction relief, the "petitioner has the burden of pleading and 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to 
relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (1996). 
2. A petitioner is not entitled to relief on any ground that was raised or addressed at trial 
or on appeal, or that could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(b) & (c). 
3. However, "a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have 
been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-106(2). 
4. Most of petitioner's claims fail because they already were or could have been raised 
on appeal. The only claim that remains is whether appellate counsel was ineffective for 
failing to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
5. "The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as 
the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 
1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). To prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Fleming 
needed to show that his appellate attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficient 
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performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 
(1984). 
6. To meet the prejudice requirement, Fleming had to demonstrate that there was a 
reasonable probability that but for appellate counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
7. Petitioner was not charged with and the jury was not instructed on the crime of child 
kidnapping. 
8. The information and the jury instructions used the words "seize, confine, detain or 
transport." These words came from a prior version of the aggravated kidnapping statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999). 
9. The appropriate version of the aggravated kidnapping statute no longer uses the words 
"seize, confine, detain or transport." It merely states that a person commits aggravated 
kidnapping if he does certain things in the course of committing unlawful detention or 
kidnapping. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302. 
10. The relevant portions of the kidnnapping statute state that kidnapping occurs when 
someone "detains or retrains the victim" or "moves the victim any substantial distance." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301. 
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11. A person commits unlawful detention when he "detains or retrains the victim" under 
certain circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-304. 
12. The term "transport" may be a lower standard than "moves the victim any substantial 
distance." 
13. However, transporting or moving the victim was not at issue in this case. Both parties 
agreed that the victim and the defendant were in a car, and drove to several ATM's. 
14. Therefore, the difference in terminology was not significant in this case. 
15. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for not alleging on appeal that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the erroneous jury instructions, because even if this issue 
had been raised on appeal, there was no reasonable probability that the result would have 
been different. 
16. Petitioner failed to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because 
appellate counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise on appeal issues that were 
not likely to succeed. Carter v. Galetka. 2001 UT 96, \ 48,44 P.3d 626. 
17. Petitioner was not substantively charged with theft or financial transaction card 
crimes. Those instructions were used to explain possible aggravators, so that the jury could 
decide whether the State had established the elements of aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping. 
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18. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to allege that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions concerning theft and financial transaction 
card crimes, because those jury instructions were appropriate. 
19. The prosecutor did not use the elements of child kidnapping to prosecute petitioner. 
20. The prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct by mentioning in closing 
argument that the victim was a student a BYU. 
21. It was not prosecutorial misconduct to refer to jury instructions that had been 
approved by the court. 
22. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct on appeal, because no prosecutorial misconduct occurred. 
23. This ruling moots or disposes of all of petitioner's other motions or requests, such as 
his requests for discovery. 
DATED this l / day of March, 2008. 
BY THE COURT-
Erin Riley, #8375 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L. ShurtlefT, #4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARL FLEMING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 070901186 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
ORDER 
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Court hereby 
ORDERS: 
1. That the State's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and that the petition is 
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
A p R - \ 2008 
W, ^ U K E COUNTY 
2. Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[ajny party may appeal from the trial 
court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court 
having jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-110. A written notice of appeal 
must be filed within 30 days. 
DATED this $f day of March, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CARL STANLEY FLEMING, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20040570-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his convictions for one count each of aggravated robbery and 
aggravated kidnapping, both first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 and § 78-3a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pour-over 
provisions). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVTEW 
Issue No. 1: Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for 
affirmatively approving jury instructions that correctly set forth the statutory and charged 
elements of aggravated kidnapping? 
Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time 
on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, \ 13,55 P.3d 1131. 
•Vn 
Issue No. 2: Has defendant met his burden of proving his counsel's ineffectiveness 
at trial where defendant has not adequately briefed his claims of ineffectiveness and where 
his claims depend almost entirely on a mischaracterization of the record? 
Standard of Review: Appellant "bears the burden of establishing that his trial counsel 
was ineffective," State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 8,12 P.3d 92. As stated, ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, \ 13. 
Issue No. 3: Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not asking 
the trial court to merge his aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions where 
the detention was not slight, inconsequential, or merely incidental to the aggravated robbery? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is the same as that for Issue No. 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004) (aggravated kidnapping); 
Utah Code Aim. § 76-5-301 (West 2004) (kidnapping); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (West 2004) (unlawful detention); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) (aggravated robbery); 
Utah Code Aim § 76-6-301 (West 2004 (robbery). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and one count of aggravated kidnapping, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004), all first degree felonies. R4-5. After a 
2 
preliminary hearing, one count of aggravated robbery was dismissed and defendant was 
bound over on the remaining counts. R3 7; Rl 51:40-41. 
The prosecutor submitted several proposed jury instructions before trial, including 
elements and definitions instructions. R65-85. Before jury voir dire, defense counsel told 
the trial court that he had reviewed the State's proposed instructions, found them "to be 
appropriate," and had no "problem with them." R152:5. Consequently, the trial court gave 
all of the prosecutor's proposed instructions as submitted Compare R65-85 with R95-122. 
The jury convicted defendant as charged. R124; R165. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of five years to life for 
aggravated robbery and ten years to life for aggravated kidnapping. R130-32. Defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. R136. The supreme court 
transferred the appeal to this Court. R147. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Stephen Porter was filling his car with gas when defendant, a stranger, begged him 
foraride. R152:70,74-75. Porter reluctantly agreed. R152:74-75. Defendant thanked him 
by holding a blade to his throat, threatening to kill him, and stealing his watch, CD player, 
debit card, and PIN number. Rl 52:78-80, 84. Defendant then forced Porter to accompany 
defendant's brief recites the evidence in the light most favorable to his version of 
events. In keeping with well-established appellate practice, this brief will recite the facts 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 2, 520 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27; State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ^  2, 6 P.3d 1116; State v. Gordon, 913 
P.2d350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
3 
him to three different ATM's while defendant and his friend withdrew as much money from 
Porter's account as his limit would allow. Rl 52:84-90. 
"He continued to pester me and pester me and pester me...." 
Porter, a 23-year-old senior at B YU, tried to visit his parents in West Valley City at 
least two or three times a month. Rl52:70,95. At about 9:00 p.m., on Friday, November 7, 
2003, Porter left Provo in his two-door Toyota Tercel for one of those visits. Rl 52:70-72. 
Porter's parents lived near 3 500 South, Rl 52:94. Thus, one route to their home from 
Provo was to take the 3300 South exit from 1-15 and travel west. Eventually, 3300 South 
jogs and turns into 3500 South. Id. But that route has several stoplights, so that Porter 
preferred to take 1-15 to Highway 201 (about 2100 South), where he would head west until 
he reached 5600 West From there Porter would turn south to 3500 South. Rl52:71, 94, 
110. Although longer, Porter's preferred route was "a little faster" because Highway 201 has 
no stoplights and its speed limit is higher than that of 3300 South. Id. 
As Porter neared the Highway 201 junction on November 7, he noticed that he was 
almost out of gas. Rl 52:72. Porter believed that the nearest gas station to the west was on 
Redwood Road. Id. Porter, however, knew of a gas station on 1300 South and State Street 
called Wayne's Comer. Porter's sister used to work across the street from Wayne's Comer 
and Porter had bought gas there before. Id. Thinking that Wayne's Corner was closer than 
Redwood Road, Porter exited 1-15 onto 1300 South and traveled east towards State Street. 
Rl 52:72-73. On the way to Wayne's Corner, Porter passed a 7-Eleven and a Maverick gas 
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station. Rl52:72-73,96. Porter did not stop at either station because a mechanic friend had 
told him that their gas contained an additive that would ruin his engine. R152:72-73. 
At Wayne's Corner, Porter used his debit card to pre-pay for his gas. Rl 52:75. Porter 
did not have any cash on him, nor did he like to carry a lot of cash because it made his 
"wallet a little bulgy." Rl 52:75-76. As Porter pumped gas, defendant approached him and 
asked for a ride. Rl 52:74. Porter, who had never seen defendant before, initially "tried to 
blow him off by telling him [that Porter] was meeting some friends." Rl52:70, 75, 98. 
When that "didn't work," Porter told defendant that one of his friends "was in the hospital, 
so [Porter] needed to go to the hospital." Rl52:75. But defendant persisted, saying that he 
also needed to go to the hospital. Id. As proof, defendant showed Porter a bruise on his 
knuckle. Id. When defendant continued "to pester me and pester me and pester me," Porter 
relented and agreed to give him a ride. Id. 
Defendant followed Porter into the gas station store while Porter bought mints with 
his debit card. Rl52:76. The two then got into Porter's car and drove off. Rl52:77. 
Defendant told Porter that he needed to first stop by his parents' home to let them know 
where he was going. Id. Defendant told Porter to go south on State Street. Rl52:77-78. 
Defendant asked if he could smoke in Porter's car. Rl 52:88. Porter, a non-smoker, said 
"no" because he did not like the smell of cigarette smoke and did not want it in his car.2 Id. 
2Defendant makes much of Porter's testimony that defendant had asked permission 
to smoke in his car, calling it "peculiarly polite behavior coming from a purported 
aggravated kidnapper and robber." Br. Aplt. 5,19, 29. In fact, there was nothing peculiar 
about this behavior because at this point defendant had not yet robbed and kidnapped 
Porter. Rather, as seen below, defendant was waiting until he could lull Porter into a 
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Defendant then asked Porter if he "ever did drugs." R152:89. When Porter said "no," 
defendant refused to believe him. Id. Defendant confided that he was at that moment on 
methamphetamine. Id. 
"Give me all your money or I will kill you." 
Defendant ultimately directed Porter to a house on a dead-end street behind the 
Franklin-Covey baseball field. Rl 52:78. Defendant asked Porter "to kill the engine because 
he didn't want to wake his parents up." Id. When Porter obeyed, defendant reached into his 
coat pocket and pulled out "a blade of some sort." Id. Holding the blade in his right hand, 
defendant reached across Porter and held it against the left side of Porter's neck. Rl 52:98. 
Porter could not see the blade, but he "sure felt it." Id. Porter thought it felt like a "razor or 
a box-cutting knife." R152:99-100. 
Defendant told Porter to "[g]ive me all your money or I will kill you." Rl 52:79. 
Porter gave defendant his wallet. Although the wallet contained no money, it held Porter's 
debit card. Id. Defendant took the card, looked at it, and asked what he could do with it. 
Id. Porter explained that defendant "could buy whatever he wanted with it." Id. Unsatisfied, 
defendant demanded something else. Id. Terrified, Porter handed defendant his watch, his 
CD player, and a book of CD's. R152:80. Each time Porter handed defendant an item, 
defendant threatened "there better be something else, or else." Id. 
After taking all of Porter's belongings, defendant put the blade away, but ordered 
Porter to drive to a friend's house, a few blocks south. Rl52:80-81. Defendant told Porter 
secluded area where he could safely rob him. 
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that if he "tried to escape or tried to run away he would kill [him]." R152:80. When they 
reached the firiend's home, defendant ordered Porter out of the car and they both walked to 
the door. Rl52:81. Defendant warned Porter "once again that if [he] ran or anything 
[defendant] had a gun and.. . would kill" him. Id. 
Defendant's friend was not at home. Rl 52:81-82. As the two walked back to the car, 
defendant took Porter's car keys. Rl 52:82. Defendant got into the driver's seat while Porter 
got into the front passenger's seat. Id. Porter did not try to escape because he "felt [his] life 
was in danger." Id. Defendant had "told [Porter] he had a gun, and there was nothing to 
dispute that." Id. And Porter had seen "the look in [defendant's] eyes when he held the 
blade against [Porter's] throat." Porter was convinced that defendant "would not have 
hesitated to use it." Id. 
"Ifelt that if I didn ft cooperate with him fully, I would be dead." 
Defendant then drove to an apartment complex across the street from Wayne's Corner. 
R152:83. Defendant pulled into the parking lot, "stuck his head out the window and called 
for another friend of his." Id. A woman, Sharon Thomas, yelled back and came downstairs. 
Rl 52:83,114-15. Defendant had Porter get into the back seat, while Thomas took his place 
in the front. R152:83. 
Although Porter could have run at this point, he "felt like he had no place to run." 
Rl52:84. Porter believed defendant "still had a gun" and that if Porter "tried to move 
[defendant] would kill [him]." Id. Porter did not "feel safe going back to Wayne's Corner, 
7 
because that's where [he] first met [defendant]." Id. Also, by then it was around 10:00 p.m. 
and all the nearby businesses "looked closed." Id. 
Once Thomas was in the car, defendant held up Porter's card and announced he had 
a credit card. R152:116. Defendant wanted Thomas to use it to buy him cigarettes "or 
charge something." Id. When Thomas pointed out that the card was "a cash card," defendant 
told her that it belonged to Porter. R152:117. Thomas asked, "If it is his card, why didn't 
he use it?" Defendant replied, "I don't want him to." 
Thomas asked Porter if the card was his. Rl 52:117. When Porter said "yes>" Thomas 
asked, "Well, are you giving me permission to use it?" Id. Porter replied, "Yes." Rl 52:117, 
126. Thomas then asked for his PIN number. R152:117. Porter gave it to her because he 
"didn't feel like [he] had a choice." Rl 52:85. Porter "felt that if [he] didn't cooperate with 
[defendant] fully, [Porter] would be dead." Id. 
Defendant drives Porter to three different ATM9s 
Defendant drove Porter and Thomas to a 7-Eleven on about 500 East and 1300 South. 
Rl 52:85. Thomas went in to use the ATM while defendant and Porter waited in the car. Id. 
Defendant threatened that if Porter made "eye contact with anybody or if [Porter did] 
anything stupid, that [defendant] would kill [Porter]." Id. Porter promised to "be cool." Id. 
But after waiting about five minutes for Thomas, defendant began "getting nervous." 
R152:85-86. Noticing this, Porter suggested that they go inside. R152:86. Porter hoped that 
he could "make eye contact or signal someone." Id. Defendant agreed, but before the two 
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went inside he "reminded [Porter] that he had the gun, and he told [Porter] that if [he] tried 
anything stupid, he would kill [him].55 Id. 
Defendant entered the 7-Eleven first, with Porter closely following him. R152:105, 
143-44. Porter tried to catch someone's eye, but "[n]o one would look at [him]." R152:87. 
Thomas joined them and the three left the store, with Thomas leaving first, then defendant, 
and lastly Porter. Id. They all got back into the car in the same positions as before. Id. 
Thomas had made two $60.00 withdrawals from the ATM. Defense Exhibits 1, 2, 3. 
Defendant then drove to a drive-through ATM at a Wells Fargo Bank on 300 South. 
R152:89, 121; Defense Ex. 4, Thomas asked Porter for his PIN number again because she 
"kept forgetting it." R152:117. Thomas then got out of the passenger door and walked 
around to the ATM where she withdrew $200.00 fromPorter's account. R152:l 18; Defense 
Ex.4. 
When Thomas returned to the car, she and defendant "seemed a little confused." 
Rl 52:89. Neither of them knew where another 7-Eleven or gas station was, "so [they] drove 
around a little bit and eventually stumbled" onto a 7-Eleven at 1300 East and 200 South. Id; 
Defense Ex. 5, 6, 7. Thomas again went in alone while defendant and Porter waited in the 
car. R152:89-90. Thomas withdrew another $200.00. Defense Ex. 5. Thomas returned to 
the car. Rl52:90. Angry that Thomas had not withdrawn more money, defendant sent her 
back into the store to get more. Id. 
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Thomas tried to withdraw an additional $400.00, but that request was denied because 
Porter's limit of $500.00 had been reached. R152:90; Defense Ex. 6. Thomas then tried to 
withdraw another $100.00, but that request was also denied. Defense Ex. 7* 
When Thomas returned to the car, she told defendant that the ATM would not let her 
withdraw any more money. R152:119. She and defendant then divided the money between 
them. R152:90-9L Thomas asked Porter if he was "OK." R152:120. Before Porter could 
answer, defendant told him, "Don't fucking talk to her " Id. Angry, Thomas told Porter, 
"Let me the hell out" Id. Defendant dropped Thomas off at about South Temple and 700 
East. R152:120-21. Porter moved up to the front passenger seat. R152:91. 
Defendant then drove Porter along North Temple to the State Fairgrounds. Id. On 
the way, Porter saw a police car on their right side. Id. Porter noted that the officer "watched 
[him] very closely when they passed him." Id. Defendant warned Porter "especially if I tried 
to get their attention he would kill me." Id. 
Defendant stopped the car on a side street near the fairgrounds where he "pause[d] a 
little bit" and "wipe[d] his fingerprints off the steering wheel." Rl 52:92. Defendant then 
told Porter that if he told "anyone what happened, he would kill [Porter]." Id. 
Porter drove directly to his parents' home because his "feeling of security had just 
been completely ripped from [him]. [He] felt vulnerable, [he] felt weak, [he] felt alone." 
Rl52:93. Porter did not drive to a police station because he did not know where one was. 
Rl 52:92. He also did not stop to call police from a pay phone because he had no money. Id. 
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After Porter returned home, he discovered a small clear, plastic tube or vial wedged 
in the driver's seat, between the back and the seat R152:101,108-09. Porter recalled that 
during the robbery and kidnapping, defendant had handed this vial to Porter to hold. 
Rl 52:101. Defendant told Porter that the tube contained methamphetamine. Id. Porter had 
tried to hold the vial on the edges so that he would not get his fingerprints on it. Rl52:110. 
Porter had hoped that doing so would also preserve defendant's fingerprints. Id. 
Porter's parents arrived home soon after he got there. R152:93. After they talked and 
hugged, Porter called the police and reported the robbery and kidnapping. Id. At that time, 
Porter told police about the vial he found in his car. R152:108. At the officer's request, 
Porter later took the vial to the police station. Rl52:108-09. The police, however, did not 
test the contents of the vial, nor did they check it for fingerprints, because they saw no 
evidentiary value in doing so. R152:145. 
The defense 
In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted that Porter was not robbed, but was 
only getting even for a fraudulent drug deal. Rl 52:64-68. Counsel explained that defendant 
was a drug dealer who offered to sell Porter some methamphetamine. Rl 52:64-65. Counsel 
claimed that since Porter did not have any cash, he, defendant, and Thomas went to several 
different locations where they withdrew cash in order to pay for the drugs. Rl52:65-67. 
Defense counsel claimed that Porter waited to call police until after he got home because it 
was only then that he discovered that defendant had sold him rock salt instead of 
methamphetamine. Rl52:67. Defense counsel also asserted in opening that Porter never 
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described a knife or blade of any sort to police. Id. Defense counsel explained that when 
defendant was apprehended over two months later, police found "a little tool in his pocket" 
that included "a small knife blade." Id. Counsel suggested that when police described this 
"little fold-out tool" to Porter, he adopted that description as the blade that defendant held 
to his neck. R152:67-68. 
To support his theory of the case, defense counsel elicited from Porter on cross-
examination that Porter had taken a longer route to his home and passed several gas stations 
before reaching Wayne's Corner. Rl52:94-97. Defense counsel elicited from Thomas on 
cross-examination that she had never seen defendant display a knife or gun and that she never 
heard defendant threaten Porter. R152:125-26. Counsel also elicited from Thomas, a drug 
addict, that she knew that drug deals were regularly conducted at Wayne's Comer. 
Rl 52:123 • Thomas also testified on cross that although she did not know if defendant was 
an "actual drug dealer," she had seen him sell drugs to people in the past. Id. 
In addition to building his case on cross-examination, defense counsel called 
Detective Todd Mitchell. R152:131,149. Detective Mitchell testified on direct that Porter 
described the blade that defendant had used "as a metallic-colored, switchblade-shaped 
object." R152:134. When defendant was arrested, about two-and-one-half months after the 
robbery, defendant had on him a small cctool or knife, gadget" Rl 52:132-33. Detective 
Mitchell believed that this small "tool" was "close" to the blade that Porter had described to 
him. Rl 52:134-3 5. A photo of the small tool found on defendant—Defense Exhibit 9—was 
received into evidence over the State's relevance objection. R152:135; see Addendum C. 
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The State argued that the small tool was irrelevant because it had been seized two and a half 
months after the incident R152:133,135. Defense counsel contended that it was relevant 
because it contradicted Porter's testimony that he had never seen a knife and showed that 
Porter had simply adopted the detective's description of a blade found on defendant 
R152:135. Defense counsel explained that he was "not suggesting that [the tool] was 
actually used. But it goes to impeachment of statement of witnesses in the case." Id. Based 
on that explanation, the trial court received Defense Exhibit No. 9 into evidence. Id. 
Detective Mitchell also testified on direct that he had obtained bank records showing 
the withdrawals from Porter's bank account that night R152:135-36. See Defense Exhibits 
1-7. None of those records showed Porter's claimed purchase of gas and mints at Wayne's 
Comer. R152:139. When questioned about this, Detective Mitchell said that he must have 
only requested the records for the ATM withdrawals, although he did not specifically recall 
doing so. R152:139-40. 
After defendant's closing argument, but before the State's rebuttal, the trial court 
rescinded its earlier admission of the photo of the "small tool" found on defendant. 
R152:162. The trial judge explained to the jury that she was sustaining the State's earlier 
relevance objection because "there is no evidence, credible or otherwise, presented, 
establishing that the item depicted in Defense Exhibit 9 was the item that was used, that was, 
in fact, even present on the date in question, which is November 7." Id. The court 
continued, "This item was found on the person of the defendant at the time that he was, I 
assume, arrested, taken into custody in connection with the charges, well over two months 
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later." Id. Defense counsel then stated that he assumed that the court, by its statement, was 
"not making any conclusion whether any item, in fact, was used." Id. The trial court agreed, 
explaining that "there is no evidence that this item was anywhere near the events and acts in 
question on the day we are talking about" Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping with the intent "to 
facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of a felony." The elements instruction properly listed only the charged intent 
Instruction No. 20, however, defined aggravated kidnapping according to the statute and 
listed not only the charged intent of facilitating the commission of a felony, but also two 
other statutory intents. Defendant asserts that this latter instruction might have confused the 
jury into believing that it could also convict defendant if it found that he acted with an 
uncharged intent. This, defendant asserts, may have violated his right to a unanimous verdict 
and to a preliminary hearing on the convicted offense. 
Because defense counsel affirmatively approved the challenged instruction below, it 
may be reviewed only under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant has not 
demonstrated either that his counsel performed objectively unreasonably in approving the 
instruction or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced him. First, the instructions, when read 
as a whole, would not have led the jury to believe that it could convict defendant based on 
one of the unpled and unargued theories. Second, it is apparent that the jury was unanimous 
as to the charged theory of aggravated kidnapping because the jury unanimously found that 
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defendant was also guilty of aggravated robbery. Once the jury unanimously convicted 
defendant of aggravated robbery, it necessarily found that defendant had detained the victim 
for the purpose of facilitating a felony. 
Point II: Defendant identifies six instances in which he claims his trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective. This Court should decline to reach these claims because 
defendant has not adequately briefed them. This Court should also decline to reach them 
because they are based almost entirely on a mischaracterization of record facts. 
Point HI: Defendant asserts that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to merge 
his aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery convictions. Under the facts of this case, 
however, the detention was neither slight, inconsequential, nor merely incidental to the 
aggravated robbery. To the contrary, the detention had significance independent of the 
aggravated robbery. Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for not moving to merge the two 
convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 
FOR AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVING JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT 
CORRECTLY SET FORTH THE STATUTORY AND CHARGED 
ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING 
Introduction 
A person commits aggravated kidnapping if, in the course of committing unlawful 
detention or kidnapping, he "possesses, uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" or he 
15 
"acts with intent" in one of six enumerated circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1) 
(West 2004). In this case, defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping because he 
intentionally and unlawfully detained Porter against his will with the intent "to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of 
a felony.55 R5; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(l)(b)(ii) (West 2004). 
Jury Instruction No. 20 generally defined the crime of aggravated kidnapping by 
listing the charged intent and two others included in the statute: 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person commits Aggravated Kidnapping 
if that person intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and against 
the will of the victim, by any means and in any manner seizes, confines, 
detains, or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a third 
person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. 
R117. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(l)(b) (West 2004). However, the elements 
instruction—No. 24— instructed the jury only on the intent charged in the information: 
Before you can convict the defendant . . . of the offense of Aggravated 
Kidnapping . . . you must find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every one of the following elements of the offense: 
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was committed 
with the intent to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony. 
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R121. The jury was instructed that robbery is a felony. R122. (Relevant jury instructions 
are attached in Addendum B). 
Defendant concedes that the elements instruction correctly instructed on only the 
charged theory of aggravated kidnapping—that he acted with the intent to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight from the commission of a felony, Br. Aplt. 11-
12. He argues, however, that the jury may have been misled by Instruction 20 into believing 
that they could also convict defendant if they found that he acted with the intent "to hold for 
ransom or reward," or with the intent "to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another." Br. Aplt. 12-13. Defendant asserts that this may have violated his right to a 
unanimous verdict because although "the jurors were instructed that they each had to agree 
with each verdict, they were not instructed that they had to reach a unanimous verdict on one 
factual theory underlying the aggravated kidnapping conviction." Id. Defendant contends 
that there is no way to know "which theory the jury chose as the basis for that conviction," 
because the verdict form was a general one. Br. Aplt. 13. 
Defendant alternatively argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the aggravated 
kidnapping charge because the jury was "given the option[] of convicting [him] on the basis 
of two factual theories that were never pled or bound over." Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant asserts 
that this violated his state constitutional right "to a preliminary hearing on the offense of 
conviction." Br. Aplt. 13-14. Defendant further contends that this deprived him of a fair 
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trial because he had no notice that he was accused under the two other aggravated kidnapping 
theories and therefore could not defend against them.3 Id. 
Because defendant's trial counsel affirmatively approved the challenged instruction, 
defendant may obtain appellate review of this issue only under a claim that his counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective. As explained below, defendant has not demonstrated that his 
counsel acted objectively unreasonably in approving the instruction. More important, as 
explained below, de fendant cannot show prejudice because the jury unanimously found that 
3Defendant does not challenge the technical correctness of either Instruction No. 
20 or Instruction No. 24. It should be noted, however, that both instructions use language 
from a prior version of the aggravated kidnapping statute. Before 2001, a person 
committed aggravated kidnapping if he "by any means and in any manner, seize[d], 
confine[d], detain[ed], or transported] the victim" with one of the specified intents, 
including the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1999). The former statute did not require that any detention last for a certain period of 
time. Effective April 30, 2001, the aggravated kidnapping statute was amended to simply 
provide that one commits aggravated kidnapping if he, "in the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnapping," acts with one of the specified statutory intents, 
including the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
302 (West 2004); 2001 Utah Laws ch. 301, § 4. A person commits unlawful detention if 
he "detains or restrains the victim under circumstances not constituting a violation of 
[kidnapping, child kidnapping, or aggravated kidnapping]." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 
(West 2004). A person commits kidnapping, inter alia, if he "detains or restrains the 
victim for any substantial period of time." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(1) (West 2004). 
Although simple kidnapping requires the detention to last for a substantial period time, 
unlawful detention does not have any time element. Thus, the current aggravated 
kidnapping statute still does not require a detention for any set period of time. 
Consequently, even though the instructions here used the former statutory language, the 
jury was correctly instructed on all the elements it needed to find under the current statute. 
Moreover, as explained, defense counsel affirmatively approved the instructions as 
given. On appeal, defendant does not claim that either Instruction No. 20 or Instruction 
No. 24 are incorrect for using the prior statutory language nor does he claim that this 
created any confusion with the jury. Rather, he focuses only on whether the jury 
unanimously found that he acted with the intent to facilitate a felony. The State, 
therefore, will addiess only that issue. 
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he committed aggravated robbery during the commission of the kidnapping. Thus, the jury 
necessarily unanimously found that defendant kidnapped Porter with the charged intent of 
facilitating the commission of a felony—robbery. Accordingly, neither defendant's right to 
a unanimous verdict nor to a preliminary hearing on the convicted offense was violated. 
A. Because defense counsel affirmatively approved the challenged instruction, 
defendant may obtain appellate review of this issue only under a claim that his 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
Instruction No. 20—the jury instruction defendant challenges—was one of many 
proposed by the prosecution before trial. See R65-85; R152:5. Just before jury voir dire, the 
prosecutor announced that she had submitted proposed jury instructions. Defense counsel 
immediately stated: "And I have looked at the State's instructions, and I find them to be 
appropriate. I don't have any problem with them. I don't have any particular instructions 
that I intend to offer." R152:5. Consequently, the trial court gave all the prosecutor's 
proposed instructions, including No. 20. Compare R69-85 with Rl 13-22. 
Defendant acknowledges that his trial attorney did not object to any of the jury 
instructions and that, indeed, he "informed the court that he had reviewed the instructions and 
found them to be appropriate." Br. Aplt. 16 (citing Rl 52:5). Defendant nevertheless asserts 
that this Court may, and should, review this claim "under the extraordinary circumstances, 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines." Id 
Appellate review under plain error, however, is not available when, as here, 
defendant himself invites the alleged error. Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that "[ujnless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, 
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the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." A claim 
of manifest injustice under rule 19(e) is generally reviewed under "the same standard that is 
applied to determine whether plain error exists " State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1226 
(Utah 1998). See also State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,140, 82 P.3d 1106. 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has consistently held that a defendant may not 
obtain plain error or manifest injustice review of an alleged instructional error when 
"counsel, either by statement or act affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had 
no objection to the jury instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111. 
Accord State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (defendant could not 
obtain appellate review of alleged erroneous jury instruction because he stipulated to the 
instruction); State v Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742 (denying appellate review 
of jury instruction offered by defendant); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1108-09 (Utah 
1996) (defendant invited error when he failed to object to instruction when specifically 
queried by the court); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,1023 (Utah 1987) (defendant invited 
error when his counsel actively represented to the trial court that she had read instruction and 
had no objection to it). 
Defense counsel here affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no 
objection to the challenged instruction when he stated that he had read the prosecutor's 
proposed instructions and that he believed they were all "appropriate." R152:5. Because 
defendant invited any error, he is not entitled to plain error review of the challenged 
instruction. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, f^ 61 ("we have consistently declined to review 
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allegations of jury instruction error, even under the manifest injustice standard, when the 
error complained of was invited"). 
Nor may defendant obtain appellate review under the exceptional circumstances 
doctrine. This exception to the preservation rule is "'ill-defined and applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies.955 State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 12,10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209, n.3 (Utah 1993)). The exceptional circumstances doctrine has 
been applied "sparingly" and has been reserved "for the most unusual circumstances where 
[the] failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have 
resulted in manifest injustice." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
A finding of exceptional circumstances, however, "requires something much more 
exceptional than mere oversight by trial counsel " State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5,11 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citing State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 & n.l (Utah 1993)). This is because 
such facts give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, another well-
recognized exception to the preservation rule. Id As this Court has explained, if the 
exceptional circumstances concept applied in such cases, "we would have to employ it in 
every case where there might have been ineffective assistance at trial which is not raised on 
appeal." Id. This would sanction "use of the exceptional circumstances concept as away 
to address problems caused by ineffective assistance of counsel, but without requiring 
appellant to prove up such a claim on appeal in accordance with his or her burden under the 
Sixth Amendment, as elucidated in Strickland v. Washington and its progeny." Id (citations 
omitted). Moreover, to hold otherwise would foster "invited error." See State v. Litherland, 
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2000 UT 76, % 31, 12 P.3d 92 (refusing "to give defendants the benefit of traditional plain 
error analysis where doing so would create an incentive for invited error"); State v. Brown, 
948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (refusing to review a claim where trial counsel consciously 
chose not to object because to do otherwise "would be sanctioning a procedure that fosters 
invited error"). 
In sum, having affirmatively approved the challenged instruction, the only reviewable 
claim defendant now has is that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective when he 
affirmatively approved the proposed jury instructions. 
B. Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
in approving the challenged instruction. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate 
both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
T[19 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984)). 
With respect to the first Strickland prong, an appellate court "must 'indulge in the 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 
(Utah App. 1993) and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct at 2065) (internal quotation 
22 
marks omitted). If a court can find a conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions, then 
counsel has not performed deficiently under the first Stricklandprong. See State v. Holbert, 
2002 UT App 4264 58,61 P.3d 291; see also State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, U 1 l,4P.3d778 
(holding that first prong of Strickland was not satisfied because it was conceivable that 
counsel's conduct was result of deliberate and tactical choice). 
With respect to the second Strickland prong, defendant must show that absent 
counsel's acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability of amore favorable result State 
v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48,50 (Utah 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). Such a showing 
must be based on a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." Id. 
Thus, to prevail on his claim, defendant must show that his counsel's approval of 
Instruction No. 20 "fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" 
and that absent this alleged deficient performance there was "a reasonable probability of a 
more favorable result." As explained below, defendant has not demonstrated either 
Strickland prong. 
1. Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel performed objectively 
unreasonably by approving the proposed jury instructions. 
Defendant's argument that his trial counsel performed deficiently consists of four 
sentences. Br. Aplt. 17-18. He begins with, "One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer 
is to properly raise and preserve all issues in the lower court." Br. Aplt 17. He then asserts 
that "[t]rial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous jury instructions and verdict was 
objectively deficient" because "[j]ury instructions are routinely prepared well in advance of 
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the trial, and there is no need for this Court to defer to decisions made regarding instructions, 
because these decis ions should not be made in the heat of battle." Id. at 17-18. He concludes 
with, "Permitting Mr. Fleming to be convicted of the very serious offense of aggravated 
kidnapping on the basis of confusing jury instructions and with a non-unanimous verdict 
form simply does not coalesce into any reasonable trial strategy." Id. at 18. 
Defendant's conclusory argument does not demonstrate that his counsel's approval 
of the prosecutor's proposed jury instructions was objectively unreasonable. As a threshold 
matter, defendant's argument incorrectly assumes that lack of a conceivable tactical basis 
establishes deficient performance per se. Under Strickland, however, "the proper standard 
of attorney performance is reasonably effective assistance" under "prevailing professional 
norms." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. The Strickland'test asks "whether counsel's assistance 
was reasonable considering all the circumstances," not whether there is a conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's conduct. Id. at 688. 
While it is true that the existence of a conceivable tactical basis demonstrates that 
counsel acted reasonably, it does not necessarily follow that lack of a conceivable tactical 
basis means that counsel's conduct was objectively unreasonable. Rather, "'[t]he relevant 
question is not whether counsel's choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.'" 
Bullockv. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036,1041 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. 470, 480 (2000)), cert denied by 537 U.S. 1093 (2002). Thus, counsel may make 
mistakes for which there is no strategic explanation, so long as his conduct is objectively 
reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Id. at 1047-51. 
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Here, trial counsel acted objectively reasonably under all the circumstances because 
he had no reason to object to Instruction No. 20 or to the lack of a special verdict form. As 
defendant has conceded, the elements instruction correctly instructed the jury on only the 
charged intent of aggravated kidnapping—facilitating the commission of a felony. 
Instruction No. 20 also correctly stated that aggravated kidnapping could be committed with 
various intents, including the charged intent. Defendant's only complaint is that Instruction 
No. 20 might have confused the jury into thinking that it could convict him based on an 
uncharged intent. 
The intent with which defendant might have detained Porter, however, was irrelevant 
to the defense strategy. Defendant's defense was that he did not unlawfully detain Porter 
against his will. According to defendant's theory, Porter willingly went with defendant to 
get money so that he could buy drugs from defendant. Rl 52:65-67,157-58,160. If the jury 
had believed defendant's version of events, it would have simply acquitted him without ever 
considering the intent element of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, defense counsel had 
no reason to object to the instructions. 
It was therefore not objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to approve the 
instructions as written. 
2. Defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
approval of the jury instructions as written. 
But even if trial counsel had performed deficiently, defendant cannot show that he was 
prejudiced. First, the instructions, when read as a whole, would not have led the jury to 
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believe that it could convict defendant based on one of the unpled and unargued theories 
listed in Instruction No. 20. Irrespective of what Instruction 20 said, the elements instruction 
informed the jury that it could convict defendant only if it first found "from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense." R121 (emphasis added). As stated, one of the elements listed in that instruction 
was that defendant unlawfully detained Porter against his will with "the intent to facilitate 
the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission 
of a felony." R121. Thus, the elements instruction correctly and clearly informed the jury 
that it could convict defendant only if it first found that he had acted with the intent that had 
been charged in the information. Instruction No. 12 told the jury that its verdict had to be 
unanimous. Thus, even though Instruction 20 mentioned three possible intents, the jury was 
expressly instructed that it had to unanimously find the charged intent before it could convict 
defendant 
Second, based on the elements instruction, the evidence, and the arguments before it, 
the jury clearly understood that it could convict defendant only if it found that he committed 
kidnapping with the intent to facilitate a felony. As stated, the elements instruction informed 
the jury that it had to find that element. Other instructions gave the jury three possible 
felonies to choose from: use of a financial transaction card without the consent of the owner, 
theft of over a $1000, and robbery. Rl 19, 120, 122. In closing argument, the prosecutor 
explained the elements of aggravated kidnapping. Based on the elements instruction, she 
argued that the jury had to find that the kidnapping "took place with the intent to facilitate 
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the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission 
of felony." Rl 52:153-54. The prosecutor then explained that defendant had committed three 
felonies: theft over a $1,000, use of a financial transaction card, and robbery. Rl 52:154-55. 
No one argued that the jury could find defendant guilty under the other intents mentioned in 
Instruction No. 20. Indeed, the evidence at trial supported only the charged theory. 
And finally, it is apparent in this case that the jury was unanimous as to the charged 
theory of aggravated kidnapping because the jury unanimously found defendant guilty of 
aggravated robbery. Once the jury unanimously convicted defendant of aggravated robbery, 
it necessarily found that defendant had detained Porter to facilitate a felony. 
This conclusion is compelled by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. 
Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993). Germonto was charged with murder. Id. at 57, The 
trial court instructed the jury on the four statutory variants of murder, but did not require jury 
unanimity on the particular variant relied on for conviction. Id. Like defendant does here, 
Germonto claimed that the trial court deprived him of the right to a unanimous jury verdict 
because it failed to instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous on the theory it convicted on. 
Id at 57. 
The Utah Supreme Court had previously held that jury unanimity was not required 
when only the first three variants of murder—intentional or knowing, intending to cause 
serious bodily injury, and depraved indifference—were charged. Id. But the Court had never 
addressed whether unanimity was required when the fourth variant—felony murder—was 
also charged. Id. The Court found no occasion to address the issue in Germonto, however, 
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because the jury had also convicted Germonto of robbery, the predicate felony underlying 
the murder conviction. The Germonto court concluded that the "murder conviction was thus 
unanimous as a matter of law under the fourth variant," and "the fact that the evidence might 
also support a Gonviction under the other three variants is therefore ultimately irrelevant." 
Id (citing State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986) (holding that where jury was 
necessarily unanimous on one alternative aggravating circumstance for first degree murder, 
constitutional adequacy of another alternative need not be addressed)). 
Here, defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping with the intent to facilitate 
the commission of a felony. The jury unanimously convicted defendant of committing 
aggravated robbery at the same time. The jury was instructed that robbeiy was a felony. The 
jury was therefore unanimous as a matter of law on the charged theory of aggravated 
kidnapping. Accoi dingly, defendant was denied neither his right to a unanimous jury verdict 
nor to a preliminary hearing on the offense of conviction. Defendant counsel's alleged 
deficient performance, therefore, could not have prejudiced defendant. 
POINT n 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT 
HIS COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT TRIAL 
WHERE HE HAS NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIMS AND 
WHERE HIS CLAIMS REST ALMOST ENTIRELY ON A 
MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE RECORD FACTS 
Defendant asserts that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by 
introducing harmful evidence and failing to recognize and assert helpful evidence. Br. Aplt. 
22-23. Defendant cites six instances of his counsel's alleged failures at trial. Id 
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Defendant "bears the burden of establishing that his trial counsel was ineffective." 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 8, 12 P.3d 92. As explained in Point I, defendant must 
prove to this Court that his counsel performed objectively unreasonably arafthat counsel's 
alleged deficient performance prejudiced him. Defendant has not carried his burden. First, 
he does not adequately brief any of his six ineffectiveness claims. Second, his claims are 
based almost entirely on a mischaracterization of the record. 
A. Defendant has not met his burden under Strickland because he has not 
adequately briefed his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's brief to set 
forth an argument that "contain[s] the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied OIL" It is 
not enough under this rule to superficially cite to authority; rather, the rule requires a 
"substantive examination" of the contention presented. State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, fflf 11-
13,974 P.2d 269. Moreover, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at f^ 11 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 6, 1 P.3d 1108. '"It is well 
established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately 
briefed.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, If 15,99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (Utah 1998)). 
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Although defendant sets forth the correct Strickland standard, he provides no legal 
authority or analysis specific to his six allegations of ineffectiveness. In the span of three 
pages he throws out his six allegations, but exerts no effort to explain how counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient in each instance. Indeed, none of defendant's 
individual ineffectiveness claims receives more than half a page. See Br. Aplt. 22-25. 
Nowhere does defendant acknowledge that his trial counsel may have had a reasonable 
strategic reason for his actions. Nor does he analyze each of his specific claims in the 
context of his attorney's whole trial strategy. Indeed, defendant fails to even acknowledge 
that his attorney had a cohesive trial strategy and that his attorney's acts and omissions all 
consistently supported that strategy. 
Defendant's claim of prejudice is equally lacking. Instead of explaining how each 
claimed deficiency prejudiced him, defendant merely asserts that "the State's case against 
him was far less than compelling." Br. Aplt. 28. He then recites the facts supporting his 
version of events and points out what he considers to be weaknesses in the victim's story. 
Br. Aplt. 28-31. Defendant then lists each of his counsel's claimed deficiencies and broadly 
concludes after each one that "there is reasonable probability of a different result" absent 
each failure. Br. Aplt. 30-31. Again, however, defendant fails to analyze his claim of 
prejudice in the context of all the evidence at trial and his attorney's whole trial strategy. 
In short, defendant has "dump[ed] the burden of argument and research" on both the 
Court and on the State. Given his failure to explain how his attorney performed objectively 
unreasonably in a way that adversely affected the outcome, defendant has not met his heavy 
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burden under Strickland. This alone is reason to reject these ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. 
B. Defendant's ineffectiveness claims are based on a mischaracterization of the 
record. 
This Court should also decline to address defendant's six ineffectiveness claims 
because they are based almost entirely on a mischaracterization of the record facts. In 
support of his claims, defendant has presented selective facts that support only his version 
of events, omitted important facts that show counsel acted reasonably, and then distorted the 
record to the point of misrepresentation. 
For example, defendant first faults his trial counsel for not pointing out the "bizarre 
nature of Porter's claim that [defendant], a supposed meth user, asked his supposed robbery 
and kidnapping victim to hold his vial of drugs during the course of the supposed kidnapping 
and robbery." Br. Aplt. 22. Defendant ignores, however, that it was defense counsel who, 
on cross-examination, elicited the information about the vial in the first place. R152:100, 
108-09. The information about the vial was important to defendant's theory that Porter 
reported him to police only to get revenge for a fraudulent drug deal. The existence of the 
vial and the fact that Porter had it with him when he reached his parents' home supported that 
theory. Thus, counsel had no need to point out "the bizarre nature" of Porter's claim 
regarding the vial. 
With respect to his second argument, defendant criticizes his counsel for not pointing 
out Porter's "unusual" claim that defendant "supposedly asked Porter's permission to smoke 
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a cigarette in his car." Br. Aplt. 22. But in closing argument, defense counsel did refer to 
this claim and used it to undercut the victim's credibility: "[Porter] claims that he is afraid 
of [defendant]. Well, he tells him he doesn't want him to smoke in his car. He is not afraid 
to tell him that." Rl 52:15 8. Defendant does not explain how calling this testimony "bizarre" 
would have aided Ms cause any more. 
Defendant's second claim also faults his counsel for not asking "Porter why he was 
searching his car [when he found the vial] before he called police to report the robbery." Br. 
Aplt. 22. Nothing in the record, however, suggests that Porter was "searching" his car before 
calling police. Porter merely testified on cross-examination that after he reached his parents' 
home, he found the vial in the driver's seat, "wedged between the two sides, the back and the 
seat." R152:109. Given that Porter had just gotten out of the driver's seat, there is no reason 
to believe that he had to "search" his car in order to discover the vial. In any event, as 
explained, the defense theory was that Porter had willingly bought the vial from defendant. 
Suggesting that Porter had to search to find the vial would have undercut that theory. 
Defendant thirdly complains that his counsel did not "reiterate" Thompson's 
testimony that "she used Porter's card and personal identification number with his express 
permission." Br. Aplt. 22. Defendant ignores Porter's testimony that while he gave 
Thompson his PIN number and told her she could use the card, he did so only because he was 
afraid that defendant would harm him. Thus, while Thompson might have been able to use 
this testimony to justify and rationalize her actions, defendant could not have used it to 
justify his conduct because he knew that Porter's "permission" was coerced. Defendant also 
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omits that his counsel argued that Porter willingly allowed defendant and Thompson to use 
his debit card by emphasizing other factual points. For example, counsel argued in closing 
that Porter did not run away or seek help despite several opportunities to do so and that the 
surveillance tape showed Porter following defendant into the first 7-Eleven. R152:159-60. 
"This," counsel argued "was not the act of someone being robbed." R152:160. Emphasizing 
Thompson's testimony that Porter gave her permission to use the card was therefore 
unnecessary and would have added little to counsel's overall argument and strategy. 
Defendant also faults his attorney for not informing the jury that Thompson had 
received immunity in exchange for her testimony. Br. Aplt. 22. What defendant does not 
disclose is that defense counsel used Thompson's testimony to support his theory that 
defendant did not rob or kidnap Porter. On cross-examination, Thompson testified that she 
never heard defendant threaten Porter, or display a knife or a gun. Rl 52:125-26. Indeed, 
Thompson had never seen defendant carry a gun. R152:126. Thompson also testified that 
she had seen defendant sell drugs and that she had frequently been to Wayne's Comer where 
"a significant amount of drug dealing goes on." R152:123. Defense counsel also elicited 
from Thompson that drug dealers generally accept only cash, thereby supporting defendant's 
theory that Porter willingly went with defendant to withdraw money from an ATM. 
Rl52:123-24. In short, although Thompson was called by the State, defense counsel 
substantially used her testimony to support his theory of the case. Accordingly, defense 
counsel may have reasonably decided that he did not want to zealously impeach Thompson's 
credibility. 
33 
Defendant next faults his attorney for introducing evidence that when defendant was 
arrested, he was carrying "a weapon with two blades." Br. Aplt. 23. The word "weapon" 
exaggerates the nature of the item found on defendant. Defense Exhibit 9 shows what trial 
counsel accurately described as a "a little tool in his pocket" or a "little fold-out tool" that 
included "a small knife blade." Rl52:67-68; see Addendum C. The two blades on this 
small "tool" were no more than 1 1/2 inches each. See Defense Ex. 9. Indeed, both blades 
look very much like what one might see on nail clippers or on a very small pocket knife. 
Defendant suggests that his attorney essentially corroborated the State's case when 
he introduced Defense Exhibit 9. Br. Aplt 23-24. Again, defendant mischaracterizes the 
record by omitting that his attorney clearly explained that his reason for offering the exhibit 
was to impeach Porter's testimony. R152:135. Although Porter had disclaimed ever seeing 
the blade held to his neck, Detective Mitchell testified that Porter had described the blade "as 
a metallic-colored, switchblade-shaped object." Rl 52:134. Defense counsel tried to use the 
exhibit to establish that Porter was not credible because he had essentially adopted Mitchell's 
description of the small tool seized by police. R152:132-35. Indeed, counsel made clear that 
he was not suggesting that this "small tool" was actually used; he argued only that it went "to 
impeachment of statements of witnesses in the case." R152:135. Consistent with that theory, 
defense counsel argued in closing: 
Porter claims that [defendant] threatened him with an X-ACTO type 
blade. Fact, Sharon Thompson never saw a blade or weapon of any kind. 
Fact, Porter himself never saw a blade or a weapon of any kind. Detective 
Mitchell claims that Porter describes this knife to him in some detail, giving 
dimensions, about two and a half inches by three quarters of an inch. Fact, this 
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particular tool that you have, I think it is one of the defendant's exhibits, a 
photograph of this tool, was taken from [defendant] two and a half months 
later. And Porter claims that he never described any dimensions. So 
somebody there, one of the two, has got their facts mixed up. 
Rl 52:158. Thus, the record clearly demonstrates that trial counsel had a carefully thought-
out strategic reason for admitting Defense Exhibit 9. That conscious decision was 
objectively reasonable. Moreover, defendant cannot show prejudice where the trial court 
ultimately excluded the exhibit and instructed the jury that no credible evidence showed that 
defendant had the "small tool" on the night of the offenses. Rl 52:162. See State v. Harmon, 
956 P.2d 262, 271-72 (Utah 1998) (jury generally presumed to have followed all judge's 
instructions, including curative ones).4 
Defendant next asserts that his trial court erred in introducing evidence that defendant 
tried to steal more than $1,000. Br. Aplt 23. This fact was necessary to establish that theft 
and using a financial transaction card without the owner's permission were felonies. The 
jury was instructed that these two crimes, based on the amount defendant attempted to steal, 
were felonies (in addition to robbery) that could serve as a basis for finding that defendant 
kidnapped Porter with the intent to facilitate a felony. Rl 19-20, 122. Defendant, however, 
has not shown any harm where the jury found defendant guilty of another predicate felony 
for kidnapping—aggravated robbery. Given that the jury unanimously convicted defendant 
4It is also likely that trial counsel saw no downside to introducing Defense Exhibit 
9, given that the "small tool" was not at all threatening or dangerous looking. Anyone 
viewing that exhibit would be hard-pressed to conclude that this was a dangerous weapon. 
See Addendum C. Thus, it is highly unlikely that introduction of this error prejudiced 
defendant. 
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based on this theory, see Point I above, counsel's alleged deficient performance in this regard 
cannot have prejudiced defendant 
Finally, defendant claims his attorney did not point out the discrepancies between 
Porter's testimony regarding the timing of the crimes and the times appearing on the ATM 
withdrawal records. Br. Aplt. 23-24. In fact, there were no significant time discrepancies 
to point out. Detective Mitchell explained that each ATM receipt showed two different time 
stamps. R152:147. Detective Mitchell then explained that he had no way of knowing 
whether any of the time stamps were correct. R152:147. More important, defendant does 
not explain how challenging the time frames was likely to have given him a more favorable 
outcome. Defendant never disputed the times alleged by Porter, nor did he dispute that he 
withdrew money from Porter's account through Thompson. Defendant only claimed that 
Porter had given them permission to use his card in order to pay for drugs. Challenging the 
time frames would not have advanced his theory. 
Defendant concludes his ineffectiveness claims by asserting that the "record of the 
instant case, as summarized in the statement of facts, supra, similarly demonstrates so many 
instances where trial counsel both failed to advocate [defendant's] position, and instead 
actually advocated the State's case, that the adversary system was not functioning as it should 
have, and that trial counsel's performance unfortunately is fairly characterized as objectively 
deficient" Br. Aplt. 25. As stated, however, defendant's statement of facts selectively 
presents the facts in the light most favorable to his claim. It ignores the extensive evidence 
that supported the State's theory and the jury's verdict. It also fails to acknowledge that trial 
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counsel here had a cohesive reasonable trial strategy. Indeed, defendant's own recitation of 
the facts demonstrates that counsel skillfully presented this theory to the jury. Each 
perceived inconsistency in the victim's story was in the record because trial counsel put it 
there. That counsel's strategy ultimately failed, however, does mean that it was objectively 
unreasonable. See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,160 (Utah 1989) (the fact that counsel's 
choice of legitimate trial strategy "did not produce the expected result does not constitute 
ineffectiveness of counsel"). 
In sum, defendant's six cursory ineffectiveness claims do not carry his heavy burden 
of proving both objectively deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland. Indeed, 
defendant's claims of ineffectiveness amount to no more than the kind of hindsight second-
guessing that Strickland expressly prohibits. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. 
POINT HI 
THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CONVICTION WAS NOT 
SLIGHT, INCONSEQUENTIAL AND MERELY INCIDENTAL TO 
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CONVICTION; TRIAL COUNSEL 
THEREFORE WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOVING TO 
MERGE THE TWO CONVICTIONS 
Defendant finally argues that "the detention in this case was incidental to and inherent 
in the protracted robbery." Br. Aplt. 25. Thus, he contends, the aggravated kidnapping 
charge should be merged into the aggravated robbery charge. Id. Defendant acknowledges 
that this issue is unpreserved. Accordingly, he seeks review of this issue by claiming his trial 
counsel was ineffective for not moving to merge the two convictions. Id. Defendant's 
counsel was not ineffective, however, because under the facts of this case the detention was 
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not incidental to or inherent in the robbery. Rather, the facts supporting the aggravated 
kidnapping had significance independent of the aggravated robbery conviction. 
In State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, \ 17-19, 994 P.2d 1243, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that one circumstance giving rise to a merger of two or more separate crimes may 
occur when a defendant is convicted of both a kidnapping and a crime in which a detention 
is inherent, such as a sexual assault or robbery.5 The Firilayson court explained that "[b]y 
definition, every rape and forcible sodomy is committed against the will of the victim and 
therefore involves a necessary detention, which is, of course, required by the kidnapping 
statutes. Thus, absent a clear distinction, virtually every rape and robbery would 
automatically be a kidnapping as well." Id. at \ 19. See also State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 
247, \ 29, 9 P.3d 777 (recognizing that detention, "while not an element, is inherent in most 
aggravated robberies"). 
To prevent punishing a defendant twice for the same act, Finlayson reaffirmed the 
principle first announced in State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981): "To sustain convictions 
5The other circumstance under which merger may occur is when a defendant is 
convicted of both greater and lesser included offenses. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^  11-15. 
This circumstance is governed by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004), 
which "includes convictions on both an offense charged and a lesser included offense." 
Id. at \ 15. "Under this section, an offense is an included offense when '[i]t is established 
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged.5" Id. Defendant does not contend that there is any issue of statutory 
merger here, nor could he. The definitions of aggravated kidnapping, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-302 (West 2004), and aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) 
differ. (Copies of both statutes are contained in Addendum A). Specifically, aggravated 
robbery has no detention element and aggravated kidnapping has no taking of personal 
property element. 
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for both kidnapping and sexual assault [or robbery], the prosecutor must show that the 
kidnapping detention was longer than the necessary detention involved in the commission 
of the sexual assault [or robbery]." Finlayson, 2000 UT10, \ 19. The Finlayson court found 
the following three-part test useful in determining whether a kidnapping detention exceeded 
that required by the host crime—in this case, aggravated robbery: 
"[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or 
confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other 
crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it 
makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially 
lessens the risk of detection." 
Id at \ 23 (quoting State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)). 
Applying the foregoing test to these facts, it is clear that the kidnapping in this case 
far exceeded any detention inherent in the crime of aggravated robbery. First, the facts 
supporting the kidnapping were not "slight, inconsequential and merely incidental" to the 
aggravated robbery. The detention here began with the aggravated robbery, when defendant 
first held a blade to Porter's throat and demanded money. R152:98. The aggravated robbery 
was complete once Porter turned over his wallet, watch, CD player, and book of CD's.6 
6A person commits aggravated robbery "if in the course of committing robbery, he 
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. A 
person commits robbery when he "unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
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Defendant, however, continued to detain Porter long after he had finished robbing him. After 
taking everything Porter had of value, defendant forced Porter to drive to a friend's home. 
He then forced Porter to accompany him to the door. Rl52:80-82. This detention was 
completely unrelated and unnecessary to the aggravated robbery. Defendant then drove 
Porter to another apartment complex where defendant picked up Thompson. R152:83. This 
continued detention was also unrelated and unnecessary to the robbery. Defendant then 
detained Porter while he drove to three different ATM's, dropped Thompson off, and then 
drove to the State Fairgrounds where he finally released Porter. Rl52:85-92. This lengthy 
continued detention was also unnecessary to the robbery, which by now had long since been 
completed. Defendant's detention of Porter, then, was not "slight, inconsequential and 
merely incidental" to the aggravated robbery. 
The detention was also not of "the kind inherent in the nature" of robbery. As stated, 
defendant completed the crime of aggravated robbery as soon as Porter had turned over his 
personal property. Forcing Porter to then accompany defendant to two friends5 homes and 
to three different ATM's while the defendant's accomplice withdrew money is not the kind 
of detention that is inherent in the nature of robbery. "This was not a typical robbery where 
the victims' detention consists of them simply standing still for a few brief moments." State 
v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, Tf 33, 9 P.3d 777. Rather, the detention was "an additional 
act, completely independent of the act of taking property by force or threat of force." Id. 
against his will, by means of force or fear " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. 
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Finally, the lengthy detention in this case made the crime substantially easier to 
commit. Once defendant had Porter' s debit card, he could have obtained the PIN number and 
released Porter. Instead, defendant chose to force Porter to accompany him to the different 
ATM's to ensure that Porter had given him the correct PIN number. By keeping Porter with 
him, defendant also lessened the risk of detection. If defendant had released Porter after 
taking the debit card, Porter could have promptly notified police who might have been able 
to prevent defendant from taking as much money as he did from Porter's account. By 
detaining Porter, defendant ensured that he would be able to clean out Porter's account 
before he could be caught. 
This Court's precedent supports the foregoing analysis. In State v. Lopez, 2001 UT 
App 123, 24 P.3d 993, this Court applied Finlayson's three-part test to hold that an 
aggravated kidnapping conviction did not merge with aggravated assault There the 
defendant placed the victim in a headlock, dragged her down a flight of stairs and down a 
sidewalk that spanned the length of the apartment building, and then tried to pull her into his 
truck. Id at ^ 13. This Court held that Lopez's movement of his victim was "neither 
inconsequential nor incidental to the assault" and that it had "significance independent of the 
aggravated assault" Id at \ 13, 15. Defendant's detention of Porter far exceeded that in 
Lopez, both in time and space. 
Similarly, in Mecham, this Court held that an aggravated kidnapping conviction did 
not merge with an aggravated robbery of a movie theater. There, the defendant and his 
accomplice forced several employees up to the manager's office where they bound the 
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employees and took the day's receipts. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 33. This Court held 
that binding and confining the victims was not inherent in an aggravated robbeiy; rather, it 
was "an additional act, completely independent of the act of taking property by force or threat 
of force." Id. The Court found support for its conclusion in examples given by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in the Buggs case: 
"A standstill robbery on the street is not a kidnaping: the forced 
removal of the victim to a dark alley for robbeiy is. The removal of a rape 
victim from room to room within a dwelling solely for the convenience and 
comfort of the rapist is not a kidnapping; the removal from a public place to 
a place of seclusion is, The forced direction of a store clerk to cross the store 
to open a cash register is not a kidnaping; locking him in a cooler to facilitate 
escape is." 
Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, \ 33 n. 11 (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731). Again, defendant's 
detention of Porter was at least equal to, if not greater, than the detention in Mecham or in 
the foregoing examples. 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that the facts in Finlayson support his claim that the 
detention in this case was inherent in the robbery. Defendant misreads Finlayson. Finlayson 
lured a woman to his apartment on the pretext of studying Japanese. He then handcuffed, 
raped, and sodomized her. Finlayson^ 2000 UT 10,^4-5. After the assault, Finlayson made 
the victim cover her head while he drove her home by a circuitous route, taking an hour to 
make a trip that normally required only half an hour. Id. at f 5. Finlayson was convicted of 
rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated kidnapping. Id. at ^  1. The supreme court held that 
Finlayson's aggravated kidnapping charge merged with his sex crime convictions. Id. at f^ 
22. 
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Defendant asserts that the basis for Finlayson *s holding was that the court found "no 
substantial detention that was independent from that inherent in the rape and sodomy." Br. 
Aplt. 27. Defendant further suggests that Finlayson "expressly rejected" any claim that 
"Finlayson's conduct in making the victim wait while he got dressed, in putting a jacket over 
her head, and in driving her around for more than half an hour longer than was necessary to 
take her home" constituted an independent detention. 
Finlayson did not so hold. Finlayson's kidnapping conviction rested solely on his 
detention of the victim immediately before and during the sexual assault. Id. at % 22. The 
supreme court held that under Couch, "Finlayson's detention of the victim up to the time of 
the rape and sodomy was incidental to the assault, rather than having an independent 
significance." Id. at \ 23 (emphasis added). The supreme court concluded, however, that 
Finlayson's actions after the assault "were of an independent significance separate from the 
commission of sex crimes." Id. at \ 33. "As this detention was against the will of the victim 
for a substantial period of time, the detention appears sufficient to support a conviction for 
simple kidnapping." Id. 
The supreme court refused to sustain a separate kidnapping charge, however, because 
the argument that "defendant's actions following the sexual assault were done with the intent 
to facilitate flight was not presented to the jury." Id. at \ 32, n.3. Rather, "the only argument 
the prosecution presented to support the aggravated kidnaping charge was the handcuffing 
of the victim." Id. 
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If the detentions mFinlayson, Mecham, and Lopez had independent significance from 
their host crimes, then the detention in this case certainly does. As stated, defendant detained 
Porter long after he completed the elements of aggravated robbery—he forced him to 
accompany him to the homes of two friends and to three different ATM's .and then drove him 
several blocks to the State Fairgrounds where he finally let him go. Trial counsel, therefore, 
was not ineffective in not moving to merge these two crimes. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *?7(iav of April , 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
B.DUPAIX 
'ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004) (aggravated kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (West 2004) (kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (West 2004) (unlawful detention) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) (aggravated robbery) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004 (robbery) 
§ 76—5—302. Aggravated kidnapping 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of 
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or 
to compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) lo hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 
4, Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention 
or kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention, 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which 
may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 
76-3-406. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-302; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 15; Laws 
1995, c. 337, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp. Sess., c 10, § 5, eft April 29, 
1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 6, eft April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 69, § 2, eft May 4, 1998; 
Laws 2001, c. 301, § 4, eft April 30, 2001. 
§ 76-5-301. Kidnapping 
(1) Ail actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to 
risk of bodily injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minor's parent 
or legal guardian or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the 
minor is 14 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is 
a mentally incompetent person-
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-301; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 13; Laws 2001, c. 301, § 2, ett 
April 30, 2001. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 3 0 4 . Unlawful detention 
(1) An actor commits unlawful detention if the actor intentionally or know-
ingly, without authority of law, and against the will of the victim, detains or 
restrains the victim under circumstances not constituting a violation of: 
(a) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301; 
(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or 
(c) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is 
a mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-304; Laws 2001, c. 301, § 5, eft April 30, 2001. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 3 02 . Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: * 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
! S ? l9ll\ % \96'r § 7 6 - 6 - 3 0 2 ' L a w s 197*> c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c. 271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, eft May 5, 2003. 
§ 76-6-301. Robbery 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-301; Laws 1995, c. 222, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2004, c. 
112, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004. 
ADDENDUM B 
Relevant Jury Instructions 
"1 I i- i 
INSTRUCTION NO. l/L^ 
When you retire to deliberate, you will need to appoint someone to serve as the jury 
foreperson. You will be given a verdict form which the foreperson will fill out and sign on 
behalf of the entire jury. For each charge that has been brought against the defendant, the verdict 
form will have two blanks, one for "guilty" and the other for "not guilty." The foreperson will 
fill in the appropriate blank to reflect the jury's unanimous decision as to each offense. In filling 
out the form the foreperson needs to make sure that only one blank is marked for each charge. 
Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree with the verdict. In making 
your decisions you may not draw straws, flip a coin, or decide by majority vote. The jury's 
verdict must represent each jury member's individual, careful, and conscientious judgment 
concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence on each charge. 
• INSTRUCTION NO. jj> 
Under the the State of - Utah, a person commits 
Aggravated Kidnapping * person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authori - - - ^gainst the will of the victim, by 
any means and in --r.y manner seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield -• a: 
hostage, or Lo compel a" third person to engage in particular 
conduct or to .forbear from engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) l :> facilitate- the commission, attempted commission, or 
flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
voy co inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim 
or another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. &2-
You are instructed that use of a financial transaction card 
without the consent of the owner, with the intent to obtain 
money or property in excess of $1000 is a felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 3 
You are instrur-f^i t-]-, --,1- Mp-fi' •) over $1000 is a felony. 
\*o 
INSTRUCTION NO. J2^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Carl Stanley Fleming, 
of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as charged in count II 
of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 7th day of November, 2003, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Carl Stanley 
Fleming, did by' any means and in any manner, seize, confine, 
detain, or transport Stephen Porter; and 
2. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was done intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was against the will of Stephen Porter, and 
without authority of law; and 
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was committed with the intent to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony. 
If, aft€>r careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping as 
charged in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or 
more of the Eoregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION !l J,$ 
You are instructed that Robbery is a felony. 
l*X* 
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